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for the space of two 7ears, the deed further providing that if any
creditor should bring suit, &c., in violation of the agreement, the
said White should be wholly discharged as to all claims held by the
creditor or creditors so suing. Dingley, a creditor, who had signed
the agreement, sued the plaintiff before the two years had expired,
and in default of bail he was committed to prison. It was held
that he was not entitled to an action in addition to the discharge
from the debt which her owed; that the forfeiture of the debt was
in th.e nature of liquidated damages. It is true that the chief
justice, in concluding his opinion, remarked: "No action by the
common law lies for damages sustained by suing a civil action
when the plaintiff fails, unless it be alleged and shown to be
But as the case which he
malicious and without probable cause."
was deciding grew out of both a suit and an arrest, it cannot
be presumed that he was referring to an action in which but one
of these was present. In Cox v. Taylor the plaintiff -had sued out
an injunction under which the plaintiff had been kept out of the
use of his land for upwards of twelve years; and in Jamison v.
itclntosh, also, the complaint.was the wrongful suing out of an
JOUN D. LAwsoN.
injunction.
St. Louis.
(To be continued.)
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CHARLES 1. BONAPARTE, EXECUTOR oF ELIZABETH PATTERSON,
PLAINTIFF IN EaRon, v. THE APPEAL TAX COURT OF BALTIMORE CITY, DEFENDANT INERROR.
The registered public debt of one state, or of a city, town or county in such

state, though exempted from taxation under the laws of said state, or actually taxed
in such state, are taxable by another state, when actually owned by a resident of
the latter state.

IN error to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The following registered evidences of debt, belonging to the testatrix of the plaintiff in error, were valued to her in 1876, in her
lifetime, in the city of Baltimore, where she resided, under the
laws of Maryland: $105,000 City of New York 6 per cent. stock;
$15,000 City of New York 7 per cent. stock; $10,000 County of
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New York 7 per cent. stock; $50,000 State of Pennsylvania 6 per
cent. stock, which was exempted from taxation by the law authorizing its issue; $116,000 City of Philadelphia 6 per cent. stock;
part of which was exempted from all taxes under the laws of
Pennsylvania; and $86,000 state of Ohio 6 per cent. stock. The
interest on most of these evidences of debt was payable in the respective states under whose laws the debts were credited ; and the
securities were transferable only in person, or by power of attorney,
at appointed places in the respective states in which the eyidences
of debt were issued.
The testatrix of the plaintiff in error filed her petition in Baltimore City Court, praying that these securities might be stricken
from the list of her taxable properties on the ground that being
bonds of other states and of cities in other states, they were not
properties within the taxing jurisdiction of Maryland, under the
ruling of the Supreme Court in the Foreign Aeld Bond Case, 15
Wall. 324. A Proforma judgment having been entered in her
favor, the Appeal Tax Court of Baltimore City appealed. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the proforma judgment
of Baltimore City Court, and decided (50 Md. 534), that these properties were rightfully valued to the testatrix of the plaintiff in
error in the city of Baltimore, her place of residence, and were
there taxable. She took the case by writ of error to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The opinion of that court was delivered by
WAITE, C. J.-The question we are asked to decide in this case
is whether the registered public debt of one state, exempt from taxation by the debtor state, or actually taxed there, is taxable by
another state when owned by a resident of the latter state. We
know of no provision of the Constitution of the United States
which prohibits such taxation. It is conceded that no obligation
of the contract of the debtor state is impaired. The only agreement as to taxation was that the debt should not be taxed by the
state which created it.
It is insisted, however, that the immunity asked for arises from
art. 4, sect. 1, of the Constitution, which provides that full faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts of every
other state. We are unable to give such an effect to this provision.
No state can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.
One state cannot exempt property from taxation in another. Each

292

BONAPARTE v. BALTIMORE.

state is independent of all the others in this particular. We are
referred to no statute of the debtor state which attempts to separate
the situs of the debt from the person of the owner, even if that
is within the scope of the legislative power of the state. The debt
was registered, but that did not prevent it from following the person
of its owner. The debt still remained a chose in action, with all the
incidents which pertain to that species of property. It was "movable" like other debts and had none of the attributes of " immovability." The owner may be compelled to go to the debtor state to
get what is owing to him, but that does not affect his citizenship or
his domicile. The debtor state is in no respect his sovereign, neither
has it any of the attributes of sovereignty as to the debt it owes,
except such as belong to it as a debtor. All the obligations which
rest on the holder of the debt as a resident of the state in which he
dwells still remain, and as a member of society he must contribute
his just share towards supporting the government whose protection
he claims and to whose control he has submitted himself.
It is true, if a state could protect its securities from taxation
everywhere, it inight succeed in borrowing money at reduced
interest; but inasmuch as it cannot secure such exemption outside
of its own jurisdiction, it is compelled to go into the market as a
borrower, subject to the same disabilities in this particular as individuals. "While the Constitution of the United States might have
been so framed as to afford relief against such a disability, it has
not been, and the states are left free to extend the comity which is
sought, or not, as they please.
Taxation of the debt within the debtor state does not change the'
legal situs of the debt for any other purpose than that of the tax
which is imposed. Neither does exemption from taxation.
The judgment is affirmed.
There never was any doubt thatimmovable properties in a state, or
properties permanently lecated in a
state, were subject to the lex ret sitce,
and were, therefore, taxable by such
state: 2 Domat's Civil Law by Strahan, 2d ed., p. 330, sect. 7 ; Freke v.
Lord Carbery, 16 Eq. Cases 466, 467.
"1Movables, devoted to a purpose which
binds them as fixtures in a particular
place,"1! are not exceptions to this rule :
Savigny on Conf. of Laws, by Guthrie,

2d ed., London, 1880, p. 180; for such
properties form, parts of the proper
wealth of the state in which they are
fixtures, and are subject to the lex rei
sitce: Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall.
150. But it may certainly be insisted
that, in the United States and in England, it is a settled rule of public law,
that all movable properties belonging to
-a resident of a state, which are not so
located in another state as to form part
of its proper wealth, have no other situs
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103 Id. 804; Baltimore City Pass. By.
Co. v. Sewell, 35 Aid. 208; Angell
& Ames on Corp., 8th ed., sect. 354;
Thomson v. Ado. General, 12 Cl. & F.
17 ; In re Cigalla's Settlement, L. R., 7
Ch. Div. 356, 357.
The debts due by states, counties and
cities are not exceptions to the rule
applicable to debts due by private corporations. When states have created
debts for constitutional purposes, and
eontracted to repay them with interest,
or when municipal organizations, acting
under sufficient authority, have created
debts for such purposes, and have contracted to repay them with interest,
they have not exercised any sovereign
powers: U. S. Bank v. Planters' Bank,
9 Wheat. 907: Murray v. Charleston,
96 U. S. 445. They have exercised
the ordinary corporate power of borrowing money, in the open market, upon
terms agreed upon between them and
those who loaned 'such money. The
obligations which they have given for
the payment of the interest and principal
of the debts thus created to any lender
resident in the state or municipality
which has borrowed such money, are
properties in the hands of such resident,
which the particular state or municipality
may tax as part of his wealth: Murray
v. Charleston, supra; In re Cigala's Settlement, L. R., 7 Ch. Div. 357. Such
state or municipality cannot provide by
legislation for collecting any tax, which
it may impose on such property, by withholding from the creditor part of the
interest or principal which it had stipulated to pay him; because such legislation or method of collection would
impair the obligation of its contract,
which was to pay to the creditor the
interest and principal in solido : Murray
v. Charleston, supra. But it may, while
leaving the obligation of its contract
kept in a particular place : United States wholly untouched, direct that the pyoperty which it has thus created should be
v. Cutts, 1 Sumn. 143-149 ; Blac& v.
Zacharie, 3 How. 513 ; Dewing v. Perdi- valued by some sufficient standard, as
the property of any holder residing in
caries, 96 U. S. 196; Johnston v. Laflin,
than the domicile of their owner: Tap-

pan v. Merchants' Vat. Bank, 19 Wall.
499; .oyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 630,
631 ; Sill v. Worswick, I H. Bl. 690;
in re Ewin, 1 Cr. & J. 155 : Birtwhistle
v. Vardill, 2 Cl. & F. 575; Thomsom
v. Adv. General, 12 Id. 17, 20; In re
Cigala Settlement, L. R., 7 Ch. Div. 356,
357 ; Story on Conf. of Laws, 7th ed.,
sects. 379-381 ; 3 Burge on Col. and
For. Law 749-751 ; 4 Phill. on International Law 37. Savigny admits that
this is the American, English and
French doctrine: Savigny on Conf. of
Laws, by Guthrie, London, 180, 2d ed.
138.
The debts due by a private corporation, created in one state to a citizen of
another state, are the property of the
person to whom they are due: I Bell's
Comm., 6th ed., 510. Such debts can
have no situs separate from the domicile
of the creditor: Story on Conf. of Laws,
7th ed., sects. 362, 362 a, 399 ; Thompson v. Ado. General, 12 Cl. & F. 17.
They can be taxed in his hands only:
Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 267 ;
State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15
Id. 320 ; Murray. v. Charleston, 96 U.
S. 445 ; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 Id.
498,.499. The situs of such debts is not
separated from the domicile of their
owner by any form of security, applicable to such debts, which may have been
given to the creditor or created for his
benefit: Kirtland v. Hotchdss, 100 U.
S. 491, 492 ; nor by the fact that such
debts are made payable in the state in
which the obligations were created, and
not at the domicile of the creditor:
Kirtland v. Hotchikss, supra; nor by
any obligation which may exist to make
formal transfer of them in a particular
manner, or at a particular place; or
by the fact that the registry of such
assignments is required to be made or

BONAPARTE v. BALTIMORE.
the state or municipality creating the

ing power by the Constitution of the

debt, and may subject it, in common
with other similar property owned by
residents of such state or municipality,
to such taxes as it may be authorized to
impose for th'e support of its government. A state or municipality can exercise this power in such case, because a
debt due to a person living within its
boundaries, follows the person of the
creditor, and such creditor is a resident
within its territorial limits: Railroad
Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 267 ; State Tax
on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Id. 320;
Jlurray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 445;
Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 Id. 498, 499;
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 Id. 639; In re
.Ewin, 1 Cr. & J. 155; Thomson v.
Ado. General, 12 Cl. & F. 17, 20; In
re Cigala's Sttlement, L. R., 7 Oh.
Div. -357; 1 Jarman on Wills (Randolph & Talcott) 4. But, if the creditor
is not a resident of the state or municipal
corporation, exercising the taxing power,
then such state or municipality cannot
direct such property to be valued to the
creditor or subject it to taxatibn ; because the particular proper-ty follows the
person of the creditor, and such creditor
is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
indebted state or municipality.
See
cases last cited.
Where then can such property, so
owned, be taxed ?
. " For all national purposes, embraced
by the Federal Constitution, the states
and the citizens thereof are one, united
under the same sovereign authority, and
governed by the same laws. In other
respects, the states are necessarily
foreign to and independent of eaci,
other :" Buckner v. Finley 4 Van Lear,
2 Pet. 590; Dickins v. Beal, 10 Id.
579 ; Bank of United Stales v. Daniel,
12 Id. 53; and may ta all persons
within their respective jurisdictions, and
all property belonging to such persons
within such respective jurisdictions,
which is not expressly or by necessary
implication, withdrawn from their tax-

United States: Tappan v. 21erch. Nat.
Bank, 19 Wall. 499 ; City ofNew York
V. Miln, 11 Pet. 138; Transportation
Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S. 279, 281,
282; Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 Id. 630.
The states, though foreign and independent of each other in the administration of their domestic affairs, have been
brought into the closest possible connection by that provision of the Federal
Constitution, which declares that the
citizens of each state shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states: Const.
U. S., art. 4, sect. 2. Whatever may
he the precise scope of this provision
(WcCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 395),
it cannot be doubted that it confers upon
every citizen of each state the right to
acquire property in every other state,
and imposes on him the obligation to
hold such property, if it remains permanently within the jurisdiction of the
state, in which it was acquired, subject
to the taxing jurisdiction of such state ;
but if it does not remain within such
jurisdiction, but follows the person of
its owner, to hold it subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state of which he
is a citizen. If, therefore, the creditor
of a particular state or municipal organization, who does not reside within the
territory of the indebted community,
cannot be taxed by it, because the debt
due to him, which he had the constitutional right to acquire, is 'property,
which follows his person, and he is a
resident of another state, surely the
state of which he is a resident can
direct that such property, so owned,
shall be valued to him, and be taxed as
a part of his wealth in the state of
which he is a resident. If the state of
which such person is a resident cannot
tax such property as a portion of his
wealth, no other state can tax it. The
owner of such property is not within
the jurisdiction of any other state, and
the property which he owns has no situs
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in any other state. It would follow,
therefore, that if the state in which the
holders of the obligations of other states
and of municipalities in other states
reside, cannot tax such properties, they
are, in effect, exempted from taxation,
except when they are held by a resident
of the state by whose laws the issue of
such obligations was authorized. Such
a conclusion certainly could not be properly sanctioned. It serves no purpose
to say that the imposition of such a tax
upon the bonds of other states, owned
by residents of the taxing state, impairs
the borrowing powers of the states which
issued the obligations in such taxing
state. To this it would be sufficient to
reply, that the right of any state to
create a movable property, exempted
from taxation,- even when it formed part
of the wealth of other states, would yet
more seriously impair the taxing powers
of other states. A state which taxes the
bonds of other states or of municipalities, created by other states, when such
bonds are owned by a resident of the
taxing state, impairs no power which
the indebted states or municipalities may
exercise within their respective territorial limits. It exercises only the undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction which
it possesses over all persons and things
within its own territorial limits in a case
in which such jurisdiction has not been
abridged by the Constitution of the
United States: City of New York v.
Mlne, supra; Trapsportation Co. v.
Wheeling, 99 U. S. 281, 283; Const.
U. S., loth Amendment. Every state
has a right to repair, as far as it can,
the loss of taxable wealth, caused by the
withdrawal from its own territories of
capital belonging to a resident, by the
taxation of the property which such
resident has brought within its limits
in exchange for the capital with which
he has parted. If any possible loss
occurs to an indebted state because of
the exercise of the taxing power of
another-state over its bonds, when the

property of a resident of the taxing
state, it is certainly damnum absque
injuria. It is the exercise of a right
by.the taxing state, which causes no
more detriment than is necessarily the
result of an artificial form of government and of conflicting public interests :
Cooley on Torts 81 ; Weeks on Dam.
Abs. Inj. 16; Scdgwick on Meas. of
Dam., 6th ed., 28; Potter v. Brown, 5
East 131. .3onds issued by the United
States have their situs at the residence
of their owner, but they are, of course,
excepted from the taxing power of any
state. Although the government of the
United States is possessed of limited
powers, it has supreme authority so far
as its sovereignty extends,: Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U. S. 263 ; Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 729. No state
can interfere with the operation of these
powers, or impose the smallest restraint
upon their use: Transportation Co. v.
Wheeling, supra; Tennessee v. Davis,
supra. The United States is empowered
by the federal Constitution to borrow
money for the prescribed uses of the
government, and may issue its bonds as
evidences of its indebtedness, showing
the terms upon which the particular
debts were contracted. As the federal
government is supreme in the powers
which it possesses, it is not, of course,
subject, in any particular, to the powers
of state governments. A state, therefore, cannot tax the money which the
federal government has borrowed, and
for which it has given its bonds, though
such borrowed money may actually remain within its territorial jurisdiction,
because it is the property of the federal
government. It cannot tax the instruments which evidence the debts thus
created and promise their repayment,
although these belong to residents of
such state, because such instruments
were executed by an authority above
its own, whose contracts it cannot subject to its taxing power, even though
such contracts are in themselves pro-
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perty.' It cannot tax the credits evidenced by such contracts as separate
properties, because until the contracts
arc terminated by the rcayment of the
money due under them, the credits are
inseparable from the instruments which
secure them. In a word, it cannot tax
these bonds, because they are operations
of a government superior to itself, over
which it cannot exercise jurisdiction or
control in any form: Ate Culloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 405, 429, 432,
435; Weston v. City of Charleston, 2
Pet. 466, 469; Tennessee v. Davis,
supra. None of these reasons apply
to the taxation by states of the obligations of other states, or of municipalities
in other states,.belonging to residents of
the taxing states, because "the power
in the states to tax for the support of
the state authority reaches all the property within the state which is not
properly regarded as the instrument or
means of the federal government:
TransportationCo. v. Wheeling, supra.
These considerations induced the belief that the Supreme Court would not
adhere to its dictum in The Foreign Hield
Bond Case, 15 'Wall. 324, that the taxable situs of state and municipal securities, was the situs of the respective
debtor communities. It departed, indeed, from that dictum when in .3urray
v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 445, it limited
the exercise of the taxing power of the
states to such portions of their debts, as
were owned by creditors living within
the jurisdiction of the taxing states.
The theory that the locality of indebted
states and cities fixed the situs, as property, of the evidence of debt which
they issued, seems to rest upon a dictum
of Lord MANSFIELD in Robinson v.
Bland, 2 Burr. 1079 ; s. a., 1 W. Black.
246, cited in Story on Confi. of Laws,
7th ed., sect. 383. This was an action
on a bill of exchange, given for money
lost at play in Paris. The bill was
drawn by the loser, when in Paris, on
himself in England in favor of the win-

ner of the money. Lord MAzisrrErD,
in the course of his opinion, said, by
way of illustration: " In every disposition or contract, where the subjectmatter relates locally to England, the
law of England must govern, and must
have been intended to govern. Thus, a
conveyance or title of land, a mortgage,
a contract concerning stocks, must all
be sued upon in England ; and the local
nature of the thing reqiires them to be
carried into execution according to the
law here." In the case,.as reported in
I W. Black. 246, the words used by
Lord MANSPI.LD are stated to have
been, "so stock jobbing contracts and
the statutes thereupon have reference
to our local funds." That opinion was
delivered in 1760. So far as it relates
to the funded debt of England, its language must be interpreted with strict
reference to the nature of that funded
debt, as it existed when the opinion was
The funded debt of Engrendered.
land, at that time, was made up of
debts contracted by the government at
different periods, evidenced by annuities
charged upon particular branches of the
public revenue for a period of time, or
in perpetuity: Smith's Wealth of Nations, book 5, c.3 : 1 Bell's Comm. 6th
ed. 523; McCulloch on Taxation and
Funding 455 ; Williams on I'ers. Prop.,
4th Am. ed. 200. It is perfectly true
that such annuities, when they were first
created, were considered in England to
be real property, .descendible to the
heir: In re EFain, 1 Cr. & J. 155.
Lord HAnDWiCKE, as late as 1750,
considered them, apparently, as personal
inheritances, which the law suffered to
descend to the heir : Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves., Sr., Belt's ed. 178, 179.
In Scotland they were regarded quasi
feuda, because, by their yearly produce,
they bore some resemblance to permanent rights: 2 Bell's Comm., 6th ed.
717; 1 Ersk. Law of Scot., 1871, 285.
The inclination to treat such annuities
as realty was naturally strong in Scot-
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land, because there, by ancient law, all
personal obligations, bearing interest
until their maturity, were considered
heritable: 1 Ersk. Law of Scot., 286,
287. It is possible that the Scotch rule
and the opinion of Lord HAnrI)Wic
in Stafford v. Buckley, above referred
to, suggested the illustration which Lord
M NxSPIELD used. However that may
be, it is quite certain that later authorities lead to conclusions very different
from.those which have been, more than
once, drawn from what was said by Lord
MANSFIELD in the ease of Robinson v.
Bland, already cited. Under the Legacy
Duty Act of 36 Geo. 3, e. 52, the duty
was made chargeable upon.the legacy:
Flood on Wills of Pers. Prop. 608.
Unless the fund, constituting the legacy,
was in Great Britain, the duty did not
attach: In re Ewin, 1 Or. & J. 151;
Thomson v. Ado. General, 12 Cl. & F.
17. The situs of the fund was always
the material inquiry. The domicile of
the person bequeathing the legacy established the situs of the legacy for purposes of taxation : Attorney-General v.
Forbes, 2 01. & F. 48 ; Thomson v.
Adv. General, 12 Id. 17; Arnold V.
Arnold, 2 Mlyl. & Cr. 256; Wallace v.
Attorney-General, 1 Ch. App. Cas. 4 ;
Attorney-General v. Napier, 6 Exch.
(Wels., H. & G.) 219-222. In the
leading case of In re .Ewin, 1 Or. & J.
151, the testator, who was domiciled in
England, died possessed of considerable
property in the American, Austrian,
French and Russian funds, which funds
were transferable and the dividends payable in those respective countries only.
The executor was called on to give an account of the legacies and property of the
testator, and to pay the legacy duties.
Brougham, of counsel, contended that
the property was in the nature of real
propert ; and that it was, at all events,
local property, being payable and transferable only in the countries in which
the funds were. BXLEY,B., in delivering his opinion, pp. 153-155, said,
VOL. XXX.-38

that the will operated upon that which
"throughout, in my opinion, is English
personal property. It was pressed by
the counsel that this property was to be
considered as being in the country in
which it was real property. There 'is*
nothing in any part of the affidavits to
show that such was the character that
properly belonged to it; but some reliance was placed upon analogy between
the case of this property and property
in the English funds, which, in the creation of those funds, might originally be
considered as being real property and
descendible to the heir, but which, very
soon afterwards, was considered to be
personal property, and not descendible
to the heir, bt to go as personal property would go. Does it follow, because
the English funds were originally considered as real property, that the French
and American and Russian funds were
also so considered ?" * * * "If
it is
not real *estate, it is personal estate;
and if it is personal estate, is it in any
respect to be considered different from
personal property abiding in this
country? There is no ddubt but that
the amount, when you are receiving the
dividends, will be payable in the place
in which, by the constitution of these
funds, the dividends are payable; and
that will be America, Paris or St.
Petersburg. But you are not to look at
the place where the thing is payable or
transferable; but when once you have
ascertained that it is personal estate,
then you are to ascertain what are the
rules of law with regard to personal
estate ; that personal estate being at the
time not locally in this kingdom, but
being at the time locally situated
abroad." It was thereupon (page 156),
concluded that the foreign funds, which
were the subject of the controversy,
were, in fact, English personal property,
upon which legacy duties were chargeable. The case In re Ewin was pointedly
referred to and approved in the case of
Thomson v. Adv. General, 12 C. & F.
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17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, Lord BROUGHAM
concurring in the opinion (p. 24). Under
the Succession Duty Act of 16 & 17
Vict., c. 51, sect. 42, the duty imposed
was a first charge on the interest of the
successor in all the real and personal
property, ifi respect whereof such duty
was assessed, while it remained in the
ownership, or cq.ntrol of the successor.
The act applies to the whol6 United
Kingdom, but not to any country beyond
those realms: W~allace v. Attorney- General, L. R., I Oh. Ap. 7 (1865).
In
re Cigala's Settlement Tnsts, L. R., 7
Ch. Div. 351, the latest case bearing
upon the question, the facts were these.
An English woman, owning English
funds, French rentes and shares in the
Bank of France, and being about to
marry an Italian, assigned these properties to four trustees, three of whom
were Englishmen, upon trusts, after the
death of the survivor of the husband
and wife, for the children of the marriage. When the controversy arose, all
the trustees were Englishmen.
Both
parents died leaving children, who were
domiciled Italian subjects. The question was, whether the property in question was liable to the English succession
tax. The fixed locality of the French
rentes was relied on by counsel (p. 354).
But it was held by JEssEL, M. R. (pp.
355, 356, 357), that the properties in
question were movable properties ; that
the ownership of the properties being in
persons subject to British jurisdiction,
and the forum for deciding upon the
claims of the children being a British
court, and the properties being, in fact,
English property, the crown was entitled
to the-succession tax.
It is proper to note, at this point, that
the cases of Attorney-General v. Colckerell,
I Price 165, and Attorney-General v.
Beatssn, 7 Id. 560, which have some
relation to the questions involved in this
case, were overruled by-Attorney-General
v. Forbes, 2 Cl. & F. 80; Arnold v.
Arnold,.2 MlT. & Or. 272 ; In re Coales,

7 21. & W. 394, and by l7iomson v. Advocate-General, 12 Cl. & F. 23.
The reasoning of Mr. Wharton (Conflict of Laws, sects. 297-311), and the
rule laid down by him, sect. 311, is supposed to be at variance with the authorities which I have cited, and with the
conclusions drawn from them.
Mr. Wharton says, sect. 311, that the
rule of international law may be thus
stated: "Movables, when not massed
for the purposes of succession or marriage transfer, and when not in transit,
or following the owner's person, are
governed by the lex situs, except so far
as the parties interested may select some other law." Phillimore, alluding to the
very rule stated by Wharton, says, that,
whatever may be the merits of the doctrine, the time for adopting it can hardly
be said to have yet arrived : 4 Phill. on
Internat. Law 37 ; Story on Conflict of
Laws, 7th ed., sects. 379-381. No rule
is of value, which fails to supply the
means of ascertaining with precision,
the subject-matter to which it is applicable. Mr. Wharton excepts from the
operation of the lex rei sitw goods which
follow the person of the owner, without
incorporating in his rule any method of
determining what movables have this
quality, and what movables must be considered as devoted to a purpose, which
binds them as fixtures to a particular
place : Savigny on Conflict of Laws by
Guthrie, London, 1880, p. 180. So
much of his rule as is applicable to the
matter in controversy, amounts to no
more than this: "Movables * * *
when they do not follow the owner's
person, are governed by the lex situs."
There certainly can be no question that
this is true, but it does not give any help
in reaching a conclusion in this case.
As the author bases his reasoning to a
large extent on the text of Savigny, it
would seem that he ought to have expressed in his rule, the limitation which
Savigny engrafted on the theory which
he adopted: Savigny on Conflict of Laws
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byGuthrie, ed. 1880, p. 180. He ought
to have done more than this. The cases
cited show that movable properties are
not only massed for purposes of succession
at the domicile of the person upon whom
said ptoperties legally devolve, but also
for purposes of taxation: In re Ewin, I
Cr. & J. 155; In re Cigala Settlement
Trusts, L. R., 7 Chan. Div. 357, and
other cases already cited. If these considerations had been kept in mind, the
rule would have read as follows: Movables when devoted to a purpose which
binds them as fixtures to a place, and
when not massed for the purposes of
succession, or marriage transfer or taxation, and when not in transit are governed by the lex re sitce. Other movables
are governed by the lex domicilfi, except
so far as the parties interested may be
competent to select and have selected
some other law.
It may, some day, be decided that the
debts of states, forming parts of our
Federal Union, and of municipal organizations in such states, have, by the law
of nations, their situs within the territory of the government of which, in the
view of that universal law, those states
and municipal organizations form parts.
It can scarcely be imagined that a narrower doctrine will ever prevail.
In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court which have been adverted
to, and of the relations of the states of
our Union to each other, it is impossible
to accept the theory of Mr. Wharton that
public loans, and railway and other securities, are subject only to the lex rei sitte,
as the correct statement of the rules of
international law applicable to such "cases
in the United States. The argument
upon which he mainly relies, would not
support such application of his theory.
The fullest recognition of the application
of the rule, mobilia sequuntur personam,
to the securities of states and municipalities in states, in this country, would
not create any danger that creditors,
citizens of other states, in the same

Union, might exercise undue political
influence in the affairs of an indebted
state: Wharton on Conflict of Laws,
sect. 305. It is impossible to frame a
theory, which would show that increase
of danger to any state would result from
holding that a debt due by it, belonging
to a resident of another state, was property in such other state. Nor is the
principle insisted upon modified when
evidences of debt, issued by a state or
municipality, are registered by the debtor
community in the name of the holders
of such debts, and are required to be
transferred, upon a prescribed registry,
in the manner directed by local laws.
Such debts, when so registered, would
not in any way differ in their character
of property from unregistered evidences
of like indebtedness, which were transferable by simple endorsement, nor, indeed, from similar evidences of debts
payable to the bearers, or holders of
such evidences of debt: In re Ewvin, 1
Cr. & J. 151. Conditions, regulating
the mode of transfer of such securities,
existed in Teference to the bonds of the
city of Charleston: Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 440; but they did not
hinder the court from deciding that such
bonds had no taxable sites within the
municipal jurisdiction of Charleston if
their owner was a non-resident of the
state. The ruling of the Supreme Court
in Johnston v. Eq/lha, 103 U. S. 804,
equally shows that local conditions, regulating transfers of incorporeal property,
create no situs for such property.
There is no reason why a debt due by
a state to a citizen of another state, and
which is, therefore, the property of a
citizen in such other state, should be
considered as property having its only
legal situs within the territory of the indebted state. If any such rule is applicable to Lhe debts of states, it is equally
applicable to the debts of cities and
counties in any 9tate. It cannot be supposed, that, in the absence of any legislation affecting the question, any court
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would hold that the debt due by a city,
or county, to a resident of another city,
or county, in the same state, was property which had become blended with
the general mass of property in the indebted city, or county, when the creditor
did not live in such indebted city, or
county ? And yet, if the reasoning of
Wharton is well founded, this would be
the necessary conclusion.
The argument in favor of the taxing
power of a state, over such securities, is
summed up in a portion of the first
maxim set forth in Story on Confi. of
Laws, sects.18, 23, cited and adopted by
the Supreme Court in Ho:yt v. Sprague,
103 U. S. 630. " Every nation possesses
an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. * * * *
The direct consequence of this rule is,
that the laws of every state affect and

bind directly all property, whether real
or personal, within its territory, and
all persons who are residents within
it whether natural born subjects or
aliens."
The argument against the existence
of a taxing power in debtor states, and
debtor municipal organizations in such
states, over such securities, when owned
by a non-resident, is summed up in the
second and third maxims of the same
author, also cited and adopted by this
court in 103 U. S. 630, 631. These
maxims, considered together, assert that
no state, or nation, can, by its laws,
directly affect, or bind property out of
its own territory, or persons not resident
therein, -unless the laws of the country,
in which such property is situated, or in
which such persons reside, sanction the
exercise of such extra-territorial power.
These last maxims are stated, in another
form, in Story on Cont. of Laws, 7th
ed., sect. 388. " The municipal laws of
a country have no force beyond its territorial limits; and when another government permits them to be carried into
effect within her jurisdiction, it does so
upon a principle of comity."

It may be true that a general usage,
in relation to the situs of state and
municipal bonds and evidences of debt,
might, if it existed in the United States,
create a different rule from that sought
to be maintained upon the basis of prevailing authorities, but no such general
usage exists in this country. This is
conclusively proved by the references
subjoined to the provisions of the Codes,
Revised Statutes, or collections of the
General Statutes of states, whose legislation exists in a form permitting convenient examination. In the following
states, as will appear by the references
appended, the bonds, or stocks of other
states, and of cities and counties in
other states, owned by residents of the
respective states, are, either by express
designation, or under the broader but
equally definite name of public securities, required to be valued to the owner
thereof in the state in which lie resides.
Arkansas: Digest of Stat., 1874, ch.
116, sect. 5047, p. 885.. Delaware:
Revised Code of 1852, as amended in
1874, pp. 53. 54, vol. 14 Laws, ch. 22.
Georgia: Code of 1873, sect. 801, *p.
142. Indiana : Stats. 1876, vol. 1, ch.
22, sect. 3, p. 73. Iowa: Rev. Code,
1880, sect. 801, p. 192.
Kansas:
Stats. 1876, vol. 2, sect. 2, pp. 1006,
1009. Maine: Rev. Stats. 1871, tit. 1,
ch. 6, sect. 5, p. 129.
Maryland: I
Code, art. 81, sect. 2 (1874), ch. 483,
sect. 2 (1876), ch. 260 (1878), ch. 413
(1880), ch. 122. Massachusetts : Gen.
Stats. 1860, ch. 11, sect. 4, p. 74.
Michigan: Compiled Laws, 1871, vol.
1, ch. 21, sect. 3, pp. 359, 360. Minnesota: Gen. Stats. 1878, ch. 11, sect.
1, p. 211. Mississippi: 1880, ch. 10,
sect. 468, p. 151, sect. 474, p. 153.
Missouri: Rev. Stats. 1879, vol. 2, ch.
"145, sect. 6664, p. 1306. Nebraska:
Gen. Stats. 1873, ch. 66, sect. 2, p. 897.
New Hampshire, General Laws, 1878,
tit.. 8, ch. 53, sect. 6, p. 139. New
York: Saxton's Tax Laws, 1880, p.
31, Rev. Stat., 6th ed., p. 932. North
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of wealth represented by the debts of
states, counties, townships, school disJersey: Revision, 1877, p. 1151, par. tricts, cities and municipalities, should
63. Ohio: Rev. Stats. 1880, vol 1, be taxed in the hands of its possessors
fit. 13, ch. 1, sect. 2730, p. 706. by the states in which such possessors reOregon: Gen. Laws, 1843-1872, ch. spectively reside : Green v. Van Bus57, tit. 1, sect. 1, p. 748. Pennsyl- kirk, 7 Wall. 150.
It is immaterial whether securities,
vania: 2 Brightly's Purd. Dig., 1872,
p. 1386, sect. 170. Rhode Island:
issued by another state, or by a municiGen. Stats. 1872, tit. 8, ch. 39, sect. pality incorporated by another state,
10, p. 104. Tennessee: Acts of 1879, and owned by a residdnt of the taxing
ch. 221, p. 264. Texas: Rev. Stats. state, were or were not exempted from
1879, tit. 95, ch. 2, art. 4671, p. 679. taxation by the state which authorized
Vermont: Gen. Stats. 1862, tit. 26, the issue of such securities. Such exch. 83, sect. 4, p. 516. West Virginia:
emption can have no extra-territorial
Rev. Stats. 1879, ch. 186, sect, 47, p. operation: 103 U. S. 630, 631, except
1071. Virginia: Code, 1873, tit. 12, by general usage, or by a comity which
ch. 33, sect. 49. In the following had attained the force of general usage.
states such properties are certainly tax- There is, of course, no need of any
able, when so owned, under th6 general argument to show that securities, issued
language of the taxing laws of such by other states, or by municipal or other
states. Alabama: Code, 1876, tit. 7, corporations incorporated by other states,
are not exonerated from taxation in the
art. 3, sect. 362, p. 258. Connecticut:
Revision of 1875, fit. 12, ch. 1, sect. state which exercises this power, because
14, p. 156. Illinois : Rev. Stat. 1880, such securities are not taxed in such
other states, under their general laws,
oh. 120, sect. 1, p. 868. Wisconsin:
when owned by residents of such other
1878, tit. 13, ch. 48, sect. 1034, p. 339.
The usage, which would enable an states. Each state is free, in the absence
of constitutional provision to the conindebted state to hold out to citizens of
other states, who might purchase its trary, to exempt from taxation any class
securities, immunity of the property thus of property belonging to residents of
such state, to which it may see proper to
acquired from taxation by the states of
which they were citizens, would be grant such immunity. The power thus
fraught with injury to such other states." exercised can never operate beyond the
If the rule, mobilia sequuntur personam, jurisdiction of the state exercising it.
can be regarded only as a fiction of law, No state can, by its legislation, protect
it is certainly necessary for the purposes from taxation property within the jurisof justice, in matters of taxation, that diction of another state, owned by a
the fiction should he maintained, in order resident of such other state.
that the vast and widely diffused sum
C. J. M. Gwnx.
Carolina: Battle's Revisal, 1873, ch.
102, sect. 9, sub-sect. 5, p. 760.
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Srpreme Court of Mfichigan.
OUDDY v. HORN.
The rule by which one who rides in a private conveyance is presumed to control,
or be identified with, the driver, and to have no right of action for any injury done
him by a collision caused by the driver's negligence, cannot apply to passengers in
public conveyances, such as railwak cars or steamboats, even though they have
chartered the conveyance.
The master of a vessel cannot relieve himself of responsibility for its safe management by surrendering its control to a charterer.
Where a passenger in a.conveyance can have no control over those in charge of
it, he cannot be held to be so identified with them as to be considered a party to
theh negligence.
Passengers on a steam yacht chartered for their use, but not under their control
in matters of navigation, have a right of action against its owners for injuries
caused them by the neglig.nt management of those in charge of it.
An act wrongfully done by the joint agency or co-operation of several persons, or
done contemporaneously by them without concert, renders them liable, either jointly
or severally.
If a passenger upon one vessel is injured by its collision with another in consequence of the negligence of tie officers of both, lie has a right of action against their
jointly, and it is for the jury to fix the liability where it belongs.
Where evidence tends to make out a case for the plaintiff, its force and effect is
for the jury, and the Supreme Court will not, attempt to review or weigh it.
The Limited Liability Act of Congress exempting ship-owners from personal liability for injuries caused by the negligence of those in charge of their vessels, does
not apply to boats navigating streams connecting the great lakes.
-

ERR R to the Superior Court, Detroit.

Afred Russell, James (aplis, Hevry M. Campbell and Henry
M. Duffield, for plaintiff in error.
Wisner & Speed, for defendant in error.

MARSTON, C. J.-The following statement of facts taken from
the briefs of counsel for the defendants, is sufficiently full and
accurate for a definite understanding and discussion of the legal
questions raised. The action was commenced by the plaintiff, as
ndministrator of the estate of John Kelley, deceased, to recover
damages on account of his death caused by a collision between the
steamer "Garland," of which the defendant, Horn, was owner, and
the steam yacht "Mfamie," owned by other defendants, on the

Detroit river, July 22d 1880.

The declaration alleged, in sub-

stance, that the " Garland" was going down the river upon a
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pleasure excursion, and the "Mamie" was coming up, returning
from a pleasure excursion, and that Kelley was a passenger on the
' Mamie"; that by failure of the master of the " Garland" to
keep a proper lookout, and by his failure to give proper signals at
the proper time upon the approach of said "Ma m ie," as required
by rule 3 for the government of pilots, and by reason of the failure
of the master of the "Mamie" to give the proper signals to indicate upon which side she would pass until the vessels had approached so near that a collision was inevitable, and by reason of
to keep a
the failure of the owner and master of the "fMamie"
proper lookout upon said "MMamie," said vessels collided, and said
"Mamie" sank, causing the death by drowning of said Kelley.
The defendant, Horn, and the other defendants filed separate
pleas of the general issue. The owners of the "Mamie" also filed
a plea in abatement, alleging that proceedings had been commenced, and were then pending in the District Court of the United
States by them as owners of the " Mamie," for the purpose of
taking advantage of the statute of the United States limiting the
liability of vessel owners in certain cases. And special notice
of such proceeding was also given with the plea of the general
issue.
A trial was had upon this plea, and a verdict, by direction of
the court, rendered for the plaintiff thereon, and the trial thereupon proceeded upon the plea of the general issue, and a verdict
was rendered in favor of the defendants. The case comes here on
writ of error, and the points relied upon by the defendants will be
considered in order.
The position taken by defendant, Horn, was, that the plaintiff's
intestate was a passenger on the "Mamie" at the time of the
alleged collision, and the " Mamie" having contributed to the collision, plaintiff's intestate must, in law, be held .to have been so
far identified with those in charge of the yacht, that he could not
have recovered, if he had 'survived, for an injury suffered by him
occasioned by such collision, and that, under the terms of the
chartering or hiring of the yacht, he could not have recovered for
an injury so received.
It appeared that Rev. A. F. Bleyenberg had chartered the
steam yacht "Mamie," to carry a party of altar-boys and other,.twenty-one in all, and fourteen of them from eleven to fifteen years
of age, from Detroit to Monroe and back, for which he was to
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pay $20; and that the yacht was in charge of the master and
engineer thereof placed there by the owners. At the time of
chartering the yacht it was stated that there would be about
twenty persons to go on the trip, but no limit was placed upon the
number or as to the route to be taken in going to and returning
from Monroe.
It has not, and could not be claimed, that young Kelley had
any authority or control whatever over the master or engineer of
the yacht, or that he could have changed or directed the movements of the yacht in even the slightest degree. And while
Father Bleyenberg, we may assume, could and did have charge
of the yacht, as to the time of starting, the number of passengers
and such like, yet, as to the due and proper management of the
vessel, the steam she should carry, the speed at which she should be
run, the course she should take within certain limits, the rules she
should observe in meeting and passing other vessels, the lights she
should carry, in a word, the laws and rules applicable to such crafts
while navigating the rivers and lakes, were matters over whichhe could not rightfully be permitted to have any control or direc"
tion whatever. These were matters which the master of the vessel
could not legitimately turn over to the guidance of any person who
may have chartered the boat for a trip to and from a certain point.
Had directions been given the master to run the yacht ashore, or
upon a rock, or to run down upon and destroy a rowboat, or to not
give and answer the necessary signals when approaching another
vessel, or to not carry propei lights, clearly the master would have
been under no obligations to obey such orders, and neither he nor
the owners of the vessel could have justified such a departure from
duty by setting up the authority or directions of Father Bleyenberg therefor. In this case it was the legal duty of the yacht to
carry proper lights at night, and to give and answer certain signals in due and proper time when approaching another vessel, and
what the law had thus directed to be done could not be varied,
changed or controlled by any person who may have chartered the
vessel for the occasion. And where a person can rightly have no
voice or control, he cannot be held so identified with those in
charge as to be considered a party to their negligence. It seems
to me that any other rule could but point out the way to owners of
vessels in which they could violate all rules and regulations adoptea
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to insure the safety of passengers without incurring any liability
therefor.
The reason for holding a person riding in a private conveyance
identified with the driver thereof, and, therefore affected by the
negligence of the latter, cannot fairly, be held applicable in cases
like the present. In the case of a private conveyance the driver
is under the direction and control of the passenger, and, if not, the
latter may well decline to intrust his safety further in such conveyance. When, however, a person enters a public conveyance,
and certainly a railroad train or a steamboat, he has no such control over the movements of either, and whether he may have
chartered such conveyance for a special purpose or not, yet for a
faithful observance of the rules of law enacted for the running or
navigation thereof, he cannot be held responsible in a case like the
present, where the master is not his servant and is not subject to
his direction or authority.
The authorities cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, and which
decline to follow Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 0. B. 115, should be followed in the present case. The charterer in this case did not
appoint the officers of the boat, but was himself, and those who
accompanied him, under and subject to their power in the navigation of the vessel; and if they, thus controlling the movements
of the "BMamie" while running, and representing the owners thereof,
were guilty of negligence in the performance of their duties, those
aboard have a remedy for injuries suffered in consequence thereof.
See also Covington T. 0o. v. Kelley, 86 Ohio St. 86.
It was next insisted that there was no joint liability on the part
of the defendants. The question is not free from embarrassment,
and upon a trial the danger is that each defendant is interested
in endeavoring to throw all the blame upon the other, and perhaps
attempt to prove acts-of negligence not set forth in the declaration.
In opposition to this, it may be said that negligence caused a collision by which plaintiff's intestate was killed, and that a remedy
is given by statute to recover damages therefor; that if separate
actions are brought different. juries may acquit all the defendants,
and thus the plaintiff be defeated, although his right to recover be
unquestioned. When, Itherefore, such embarrassments are likely
to arise upon the trial, and bearing in mind that the plaintiff is
without fault and is entitled to recover-at least we must so consider in the discussion of this question-is not the plaintiff who
VoL. XX
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has thus suffered the wrong entitled to a remedy, and that the
difficulties and dangers are to be thrown upon those presumably
in the wrong, rather than upon him who was not in fault? If, in
either view, injustice is likely to be done, should not the defend
ants assume, or be charged with, the risk ? Is there, however,
likely to be any injustice done in holding them jointly liable? I
think not. The facts are likely to be brought out in such a trial;
neither will be interested in keeping back any thing tending to
show that it was the other alone that was in fault; and we cannot
assume that any wilfully false evidence will be given in the case.
The facts are quite likely, therefore, to be fully presented to the
jury, who can place the responsibility where it rightfully belongs,
either by holding both liable or by holding one party liable and
acquitting the other.
An act wrongfully done by the joint agency or co-operation of
several persons will render them liable jointly or severally. The
injury done in this case resulted. from a collision caused by the
contemporaneous act of two separate wrongdoers, who, though not
acting in concert, yet by their simultaneous wrongful acts put in
motion the agencies which together caused a single injury, and for
this the injured party could receive but a single compensation. It
is a fact that they all united in the wrongful act, or set on foot or
put in motion the agency by which it was committed. That rendered them jointly liable to the person injured, whether the act
was done by the procurement of one person or of many; and if by
many, whether, they acted with a common purpose or design in
which they all shared, or from separate and -distinct motives and
without any knowledge of the intention of each other, the nature
of the injury is not. in any degree changed or the damages increased
which the injured party has a right to receive: Stone v. Dickinson,
5 Allen 80.
In Coiegrove v. _N.
. Cent. & H~ud. River Railroad Co., 20
N. Y. 492, it was held that a passenger injured by a collision
resulting from the concurrent negligence of two railroad corporations could maintain a joint action against both. Cooper v. B. T.
Co., 75 N. Y. 116, was a case where death had resulted from a collision by two vessels, and an action against both was maintained.
In my opinion this action may be maintained against the owners
of both vessels: tillman v. Newington, 23 Albany Law Jour.
294.
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It was next insisted that the case made by the plaintiff showed
no fault or negligence on the part of the owners of the "Mamie" that
would justify a verdict against them. The rule must now be considered as settled in this state, that where the evidence tends to
make out a case for the plaintiff, the force and effect thereof must
be submitted to the jury, and that this court will not attempt to
review or weigh it.
In a case like the present it would be dangerous in the extreme
for this court to attempt to find the facts or to draw inferences from
the facts proven, or to attempt to say what might be considered an
act of negligence or sufficient evidence thereof. In our opinion.the
case upon this point should have been submitted to the jury; and,
in view of the fact that there must be a new trial, it is better that
this court should not enter upon a discussion of the facts which
lead us to this conclusion. It was also urged that this case came
within the limited liability act of Congress, and that, the defendants,
owners of the "Mamie , " were not personally liable. The learned
judge before whom the case was tried held that the "Mamie" did
not tall within the provision of the United States statutes, citing in
support thereof Am. Transp. Co. v. Hoore, 5 Mich. 368, and The
2lamje, 5 Fed. Rep. 813. We are of opinion that these cases fully
covered this question, and that the view taken by the court below
upon this point was correct.
As we have thus passed upon all the material questions raised,
and are of opinion that the court erred upon the questions designated, the judgment will be reversed, with costs, and a new trial
ordered.
The other justices concurred.
It is undoubtedly the law that the
contributory negligence of a servant
will defeat the master's action for negligence against a third person : Paterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484;
P-ideaux v. Mineral Point, 43 Wis.
527.
The question is, what persons stand
in such relations to the injured party
that their negligence will be imputed to
him? in other words, who are his servants ? It will be attempted to answer
this question :
I. As to public carriers. In Tkorogood

v. Bryan, 8 C. B. (M., G. & Scott) 115,
Thorogood was a passenger in Barber's
omnibus. He alighted from it without
requiring it to be driven up to the curb
and stopped. He was run down by a
competing omnibus, owned by the defendant, for whom there was a verdict,
on the ground that the failure of the
driver to draw up to the curb and put
plaintiff down was contributive negligence imputable to plaintiff whose servant the driver was held to be.
To the suggestion that a passenger in
a public conveyance has no control over
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J. : "But I
think that cannot with propriety be said.
He selects the couvryance. He enters
into a contract with the owner, whom,
by his servant, the driver, he employs to
drive him. If he is dissatisfied with the
mode of conveyance he is not obliged to
avail himself of it. According to the
terms of his contract, he unquestionably
has a remedy for any negligence on the
part of the person with whom he contracts for the journey. It is somewhat
remarkable that actions cf this sort are
almost invariably brought against the
rival carriage or vessel, which is only
to be accounted for by that party spirit
which more or less enters into every
transaction of life. If there is negligence on the part of those who have
contracted to carry passengers, those
who are injured have a clear and undoubted remedy against them. But it
seems strange to say tha, although the
defendant would not, under the circumstances, be liable to the owner of the
other omnibus for any damage done to
his carriage, he still would be responsible for an injury to a passenger. The
passenger is is not without remedy.
But, as regards the present defendant,
he is not altogether without fault. He
chose his own conveyance, and must
take the consequences of any default of
the driver whom he thought fit to trust:"
The otherjudges concurred. See to the
same effect Armstrong v. Lancashire
Railroad Co., L. R., 10 Exch. 47;
Bridge v. Grand Junction Railroad Co.,
3 Md.& W. 244.
The same question caile before the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Penn. St. 151.
Lichtenthaler was a brakesman upon
coal cars, which, while running upon a
railway, were derailed by running over
an oil barrel negligently placed upon
the track by defendant, Lockhart's, servants. The defendants set up the negligence of those in charge of the train as
a defence. The court affirmed the rule,
the driver thus MAULE,

making liable the carrier, whose negli
gence concurred in causing the injury.
."I do not think, however,"
said
THo.psox, J., "that the rationale of
the principle that concurring negligence
leaves the party to look to his own employee is satisfactorily expounded in the
opinions of the judges in Thorogood v.
Bryan, viz., the 'identity of the passenger with his own vehicle. I would say
the reason for it is that it better accords
with the policy of the law to hold the
carrier alone responsible in such circumstances as an incentive to care and diligence. As the law fixes responsibility
upon a different principle in the case of
the carrier as already noticed from that
of a party who does not stand in that
relation to the party injured, the very
philosophy of the requirement of greater
care is, that he shall be answerable for
omitting any duty which the law has defined as his rule and guide, and will not
permit him to escape by imputing negligence of a less culpable character to
others, but sufficient to render them
liable for the consequences of his own.
It would be altogether more just to hold
him who has engaged to observe the
highest degree of diligence and care,
and has been compensated for so doing,
rather than him upon whom no such
obligation rests, and who, not being
compensated for the observance of such
a degree of care, acts only on the duty
to observe ordinary care, and may not
be aware even of the presence of a
party who might be injured. This rule,
it cannot be doubted, will be more likely
to increase diligence than its opposite,
which would enable a negligent and
faithless party to escape the consequences of his want of care by swearing it on to another, which he would
assuredly do if temptation and opportunity offered. As this view best accords
with the law, it is proof of the existence of the rule itself."
These are the leading decisions conflicting with the principal case. In
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Thorogood v. Bryan the plaintiff got
out of the stage in a crowded street
without fequiring the driver to stop
or pull up to the curb. The de..
cision might well have been grounded
upon plaintiff's personal contributive
negligence. It may be doubted whether
even the English courts consider the
question settled by this case, for it was
decided upon a rule to show cause, a
circumstance regretted by one of the
judges, who said the subject was aA
important one and ought to be definitively
set at rest. And see the disparaging
criticisms of the rule in 1 Sm. Lead.
Cas. 220. See also Tuff v. Warman,
2 C. B. N. S. 750; Waite v. N. E.
Railroad Co., El., B. & El. 728; The
Milan, Lush. Adm. 388; 31 L. J.
(P., M. & A.) 105. And the courts
of New York, New Jersey, Kentucky
and Wisconsin have dissented to it with
great ability and vigor. See cases infra.
In affirming that the reason.for the
rule holding the carrier, alone responsible is, that so to do will be an incentive to greater care and diligence, the
Pennsylvania decision places the rule
upon a much more solid foundation than
if it be merely rested upon the legal
fiction of identity of the passenger with
the carrier. But where the concurring
negligence is that of two carriers, care
and diligence would be increased to a
still greater degree by a rule making
both liable jointly or severally.
But the Pennsylvania case seems to
give only a partial adoption to the rule
in Thorogood's Case. It holds that the
negligence which would be a defence
must be directly involved in the result;
it must by itself, or concurring with the
defendants, be the proximate cause of
the death, and it is said that "running
too rapidly on a road in bad repair,
driving instead of drawing the train,"
would not, abstractly, be such negligence as would be a defence. To be
such, the constquence of these acts, or
some of them, must have directly en-

tered into and become active agents in
the very disaster itself: Lockhart v.
Lichtenthaler, 46 Penn. St. 151, and see
Mann v. Wieand, 4 Weekly Notes of
Oases 6. In this case A. obtained permission to ride, and he did ride with B.
C.'s dogs frightened B.'s team; it ran
away ; A. was thrown out and injured,
and sued 0. It was sought to impute
the negligent acts of the driver to A.
The court said : "But the husband (A.)
had no -control or authority over the
driver; nor did the driver control the
personal conduct of the husband. He,
therefore, was not liable for the negligent conduct of the driver. * * * Nor is
it any defence to the action that the injury
was caused by tho joint negligence of,
the driver and thu plaintiff in error (C.)
* * * Negligence, in a general sense,
by the driver would not protect the
plaintiff in error from liability for a
direct and proximate injury caused by
his own negligence."
With regard to goods, it is so established by the decisions, that the contributive negligence of the carrier bars an
action by the owner against a third person whose concurrent negligence has also
contributed to the injury. "There is
nq analogy between the cases in which
passengers in one conveyance have been
held entitled to an action against
the owner of either or both of the vehicles, from the negligent management
of which injury has been received.
There is no bailment and no agency
in those cases;" but as to goods the
carrier is held to be "the bailee and
quasi the agent of the shipper:" Arctic
Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 471 ;
and see VFanderplank v. Miller, 1 Moody
& Malkin 169 ; Simpson v. Hand, 6
Whart. (Pa.) 311 ; Dugginsv.- Watson,
15 Ark. 118 ; Transfer Co.v. Kelly, 36
Ohio St. 86; Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick."
622."
Dissenting from the rule laid down in
Torogood's Case, are the following decisions: Bennett v. New Jersey Railroad
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T. Cc., 36 N.J. L. 225. A passenger in
a horse car was injured in a collision
caused by the carelessncss of the engineer of a locomotive owned by the railroad company defendant. The company
set up contributory negligence by the
horse car driver as a defence. Said7
BEASLEY, 0. J., "The proposition
claimed to be law is, that when a passenger enters a public conveyance, lie,
in some sort, becomes affected by the
negligence of the agents of those in
charge of such conveyance, at least to
the extent of debarring him from suits
against third parties for injuries occasioned by the joint carelessness of such
third parties, and that of the servants
having the control of the vehicle in
which he is riding."
The position has for its support the
case of forogood v. Bryan, 8 Mann.,
Gr. & Scott 116. The authority is in
every respect in point. * * * The reason given for the judgment is, that the
passenger in the omnibus must be considered as identified with the driver of
the omnibus in which he voluntarily
becomes a passenger, and that the negligoce of the driver is the negligence of
the passenger. But I have entirely
failed to perceive how it is that the
passenger in a public conveyance becomes identified, in any legal sense,
with the driver of such conveyance.
Such identification could result only in
one way, that is by considering such
driver the servant of the passenger. I
can see no ground upon which such a
relationship is to be fcunded. In a
practical point of view it certainly does
not exist. The passenger has no control over the driver or agent in charge
of the vehicle. And it is this right to
control the conduct of tha agent, which
is the foundation of the doctrine that
the master it to be affected by the acts
of his servant. To hold that the conductor of a street car or of a railroad
train is the agent of: the numerous
passengers who may chance to be in it

would be a pure fiction.

In reality there

is no such agency, and if we impute it,
and correctly imply legal principles, the
passenger, on the occurrence of an accident from the carelessness of the person
in charge of the vehicle in which he is
being conveyed, would be without any
remedy. It is obvious in a suit against
the proprietor of the car, in which he was
a passenger, there could be no recovery
if the driver or conductor of such car is
to be regarded as the servant of the
passenger, and so on the same ground
each passenger would be liable to every
person injured by the carelessness of
such driver or conductor, because, if the
negligence of such agent is to be attributed to the passenger for one purpose, it would be entirely arbitrary to
say that he is not to be affected by it for
other purposes, and yet it is to be presumed that no court would go this
length and impose on each person being
carriedby a railroad train responsibility
for the misconduct of the engineer or
conductor of such train. The doctrine
of the English case appears to convert
the driver of an omnibus into the servant of the passenger, for the single
purpose of preventing the passenger
from bringing suit against a third party,
whose negligence has co-operated with
that of the driver in the production of
the injury. I am compelled to dissent
to such a proposition. Under the circumstances in question, the passenger is
a perfectly innocent party having no
control over either of the wrongdoers,
and I can see no reason why, according
to the usual rule, an action will not lie
in his behalf against either or both of
the employers of such wrongdoers."
Webster v. Hudson Railroad Co., 33
N. Y. 260. In this case, HUNT, C. J.,
speaking of the passenger injured, said :
"Like every passenger in a train of
cars propelled by steam lie was passivo
in the hands of the railroad company;
unable to aid if aid was useful; unable
to delay or hasten a train ; incompetent
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and not permitted to regulate or examine
its machinery. His personal safety was
entirely under the control of others.
* * * The imputation to the plaintiff
of the negligence of another is based
upon no sound principle."
And to the same effect see Chapman v.
New Haven Railroad Co., 19 N. Y. 341 ;
Brown v. N. Y. C. Railroad Co., 32 N.
Y. 597; Sheridan v. Brooldyn, 4-c., Co.,
36 N. Y. 39; Colegrove v. New York,
4&., Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Barrett v.
Third Avenue 0,., 45 N. Y. 629. In
Kentucky, see to the same effect Danville, 6-c., Co., v. Stewart, 2 AMete. 119;
Louisville, 4-c., Co. v. Case, 9 Bush
'728. In Wisconsin, see Prideaux v.
Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513. In Ohio,
see Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St.
86; and see Perry v. Lansing, 24 N. Y.
S. C. (17 Hun) 34; Hillman v. Newington, California 1880, 23 Alb. L. Jour.
294; Cooper v. Eastern Tr. Co., 75 N.
Y. 116 ; Otis v. Thorn, 23 Ala. 469.

was free from negligence herself, ad I
am unable to perceive any reason for
imputing Coulon's negligence to her.
"If his negligence contributed to the
injury, he is liable also to an action, but
that does not exonerate the defendant.
Suppose Coulon had, by grossly negligent driving, turned over the carriage
and injured the plaintiff, is there a doubt
but he would be liable to an action for
the injury in her behalf. These views
proceed, of course, upon the assumption
that there was no relation of principal
and agent, or master and servant. Nor
were they engaged in a joint enterprise
in the sense of mutual responsibility for
each others acts, as in Bed v. East
River Ferry Company, 6 Robertson 82."
In the case here alluded to, a party in a
row-boat were run down by a steamboat,
against whose proprietors an action was
brought by the representatives of one of
the men who was drowned. The court
said: "The deceased was undoubtedly
chargeable with any neglect of his comI. As TO PRIV.TE CARuIVas.
rades, as well as his own, to do every
Robinson v. N. Y. Central, -c., Bail- act to avoid danger and insure safety,
road Co., 66 N. Y. 11, was the case of
at least, unless he did all he could to
"a gratuitnons ride by a femal6 upon repair the deficiency.
None of them
the invitation of the owner of a horse stood in the light of either employer or
and carriage."1 She was injured by a employed to the other; it was a joint
collision with a train upon defendant's expedition in which each was liable for
road. Said CHuntcH, C. J.: "Upon
the acts and omissions of the other,
what principle is it that his negligence unless he took some separate step to
is imputable to the plaintiff? It is con- repair or prevent the result of the negliceded that if by his negligence he had gence of the others : Bed v. East -River
injured a third person, she would not be Ferry Company, 6 Robertson (N. Y.)
liable. She was not responsible for his 82. This case certainly is distinguishacts, and had no right and no power to able from Robinson v. N. Y. Central,
control them. True, she had consented 6-c., Railroad Co., supra, in this: Joint
to ride with him, but as he was in every enterprisors have an authoritative voice,
respect competent and suitable, she was and speak of right in the management
not negligent in doing so. Can she be and control of the enterprise-and have
held, by consenting to ride with him, to control to a greater or less extent, may
guarantee his perfect care and diligence ? reasonably be held responsible for bad
There was no necessity for riding with management.
On the other hand, a
him. It was a voluntary act on the part lady or any other guest in a carriage
of the plaintiff, but it was not an unlaw- cannot direct its management and moveful or negligent act. She was injured ments of right and with power to enby the negligence of a third person, and
force his or her commands. Any con-
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trol over it which the guesr may exercise,
is only by the courtesy and consent of
the ownei. The view of the court in
Robinson v. N. Y. Central, 6-c., Railroad Co. is sustained in Knapp v. Dagg,
18 How. Pr. 165 ; 3fetcalf v. Baker,
11 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 431; Dyer v.
Erie Railway, 71 N. Y. 228.
But the distinction between Beck's
Case and Robinson's Case, supra, taken
by the New York court has not been
perceived in all courts. Thus in Prdeauxv.ffineralPoint, 43 Wis. 529, Mr.
Chief Justice RYAN said: "It is difficult to comprehend the distinction. The
court says that it was the case of a
gratuitous ride, by a female upon tle
invitation of the owner of a horse and
carriage. Doubtless ; but there is the
same mutual agreement of two to travel
together as of the several to sail together,
in Beck v. Ferry Co. These were in
contemplation of law as much in tie
same boat as those. A woman may and
should refuse to ride with a man, if she
dislike or distrust the man, or his horse,
or his carriage. But if she voluntarily
accept his invitation to ride, the man
may, indeed, become liable to her for
gross negligence; but as to third persons, the man is her agent to drive her
-she takes man, horse and carriage for
the jaunt, for better, for worse." And
again (p. 528) : "One voluntarily, in
a private conveyance, voluntarily trusts
his personal safety in the conveyance to
the person in control of it. Voluntary
entrance into a private conveyance
adopts the conveyance for the time
being as one's own, and assumed the
risk of the skill and care of the person
guiding it. Pro hac vice, the master of
a private yacht, or the driver of a private carriage, is accepted as agent by
every person voluntarily committing himself to it. When pater familids drives
his wife and child in his own vehicle, he
is surely their agent in driving them, to
charge them with his negligence.
It is difficult to perceive on what prin-

ciple he is less the hgent of one who
accepts his or their invitation to ride
with them. There is a personal trust in
such cases which implies an agency. So,
several persons voluntarily associating
themselves to travel together in one conveyance, not only put a personal trust
in the skill and care of that one of them
whom they trust with the direction and
control of the conveyance, but appear to
put a personal trust, each in the discretion of each, against negligence affecting the common safety. One enters a
public onveyance in some sort of moral
necessity. One generally enters a private conveyance of free choice; voluntarily trusting to its sufficiency and
safety. It appears absurd to hold that
one voluntarily choosing to ride in a
private conveyance, trusts to the sufficiency of the highway, to the care and
skill exercised in all other vehicles upon
it, to the care and skill governing trains
at railroad crossings, to the care and
skill of everything, except that which is
most immediately important to himself;
and trusts nothing to the sufficiency of
tie very vehicle in which he voluntarily
travels, nothing to the care or skill of
the person in charge of it. His voluntary entrance is an act of faith in the
driver; by implication of law, accepts
the driver as his agent to drive him. In
the absence of express adjudication, the
general rules of implied agency appear
to sanction this view. The negligence
of the driver was held imputable to the
woman in this case: Prideaux v. 3/ineral Point, 43 Wis. 513, affirmed in Ots
v. .Janesille, 47 Id. 422. See also,
Hoznfe v. Fulton, 29 Id. 2906 ; S. C. 34
Id. 608 ; L. S. 6- il. S. Railroad Co.
v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274.
The true view appears to be this: the
passengers in any conveyance, whether
carriage or boat, may. be joint eaterprisors, and as such, jointly in control
of the conveyance, and jointly and
severally chargeable with each other's
mismanagement. Again, some of the
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passengers may be guests of those in
charge of the conveyance. Having no
control over the management of the conveyance, guests are not imputable with
their negligence.
Lastly, passengers
may, as to some persons in the conveyance, hold the relation of master and
servant. Having control over such persons, their negligence is imputable to
the passepgers.
To illustrate: Two
young men together hire a carriage and
driver, in which to ride, accompanied by
two ladies. The ladies are guests, and,
except by courtesy, have no control over
either young men or driver, whose negligence is therefore not imputable to
them. The driver is the servant of the
young men.
They may control his
actions, hence they are responsible for
his want of care. The young men are

joint enterprisors, and as such, each is
responsible for the other's carelessness.
As to officers and employees of public
carriers, they appear, from the ablest and
prepondeiating authorities, not to be servants whose negligence is imputable to
passengers. As to private carriers, the
question appears to be largely one of
evidence. If the facts show the relation
of joint ehterprisors, or of master and
servant, then the negligence of a joint
enterprisor, or of a servant, is imputable
to the other joint enterprisors, or to the
master. But the writer inclines to
the view that a mere guest is not a
master or a joint enterprisor. Surely,
a guest ought not to be made responsible
for the actions and negligence of those
over whom he has no control.
ADELBERT HAMILTON.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of I1lino!7.
THE WASHINGTON ICE CO. v. SHORTALL.
Grants of land bounded on rivers or upon the margins above tide-water, carry the
exclusive right and title of the granftee to the centre of the stream, subject to the
easement of navigation, unless the terms of the grant clearly denote the intention to
stop at the margin. If the same person be the owner on both sides of the river,
he owns the whole river to the extent of the length of his lands upon it, and this
title to the middle of the stream includes the water, the bed and'all islands.
When the water of a flowing stream, running in its natural channel, is congealed,
the ice attached to the soil constitutes a part of the land and belongs to the owner
of the stream, and he has the right to prevent its removal.
The measure of damages for cutting and removing ice under such circumstances
is the value of the ice as soon as it exists as a chattel, that is, as soon as it has been
scraped, ploughed, sawed, cut and severed, and is ready for removal.

ACTION of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought in the Circuit

Court of Cook county, by Shortall, against the Washington Ice
Company, for cutting, removing and appropriating, in January

and February 1879, a quantity of ice which had formed on the
bed of the Calumet river, within the limits of plaintiff's land in
Cook county.
Defendant pleaded the general issue and liberum tenementum.

On the trial, the patent from the United States to Laframbois
VOL. XXX.-40
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and Decant, was introduced in evidence, showing that there was
no restriction or reservation by the government, and that the Zoeus
in quo was embraced in the 125 31-100 acres the patent conveyed.
Under this patent plaintiff derived title.
From the evidence it appeared that the call of 125 31-100 acres
contained in the patent, required that the bed of the river should
be included to make that quantity; that the Calumet river
extended from Lake Miehigan westward, past the plaintiff's premises, where it is between 165 and 200 feet wide, and is, in fact, a
navigable river; that the defendant company owned ice-houses on
their own property in the next lot east of plaintiff's; and that
in operating on the ice, it did not go on the plaintiff's land save
as it entered upon the ice; that it first gathered the ice in front
of its own land from the river, and then commenced to take the
ice opposite the plaintiff's premises.
The court, at plaintiff's request, instructed the jury that the
plaintiff was the owner of the whole bed of the river flowing
through his premises; that when the water became congealed, the
ice attached to the soil constituted a part-thereof, and belonged to
the owner of the bed of the stream, and that he could maintain
trespass for the wrongful entry and taking the ice; and that the
measure of damages in case of a finding for plaintiff, would be the
value of the ice as soon as it existed- as a chattel, that is, as soon
as it had been scraped, ploughed, sawed, cut and severed and ready
for removal.
Defendant excepted to the giving of such instructions, and
asked the court to instruct the jury, that a riparian owner on the
bank of a river navigable infact, has no property in the ice formed
in the midst of the stream where he h-as done nothing to pond or'
separate it; but that any person might, as against such riparian
owner, where he could gain access without passing over the shore
or banks of the owner, enter upon the .ice and remove the same
without cause of action or damage to such riphrian owner; and
that if such access as above stated, had been gained, then at
most plaintiff could recover but nominal damages, even if the
action of trespass be sustained. This instruction was refused;
and defendant excepted.
A verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of plaintiff for
$562.40, which judgment, on appeal to the Appellate Court for
the First District, was affirmed, and defendant appealed to this
court.
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Francis H. Kales, for appellant.
Joseph Wright, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-It may be well to inquire first, whether plaintiff,
as riparian proprietor of both sides of the Calumet river, is the
owner of the bed of the stream within the limits of this land. By
the common law only arms of the sea, and streams where the tide
ebbs and flows, are regarded navigable. The stream above the
tide, although it may be navigable in fact, belongs to the riparian
proprietors on each side of it to its centre; and the only right the
public has therein is an easement tor the purpose of navigation.
Chancellor KENT, in his commentaries, declared it as settled that
grants of land bounded on rivers, or upon the margins above tidewater, carry the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the
centre of the stream, subject to the easement of navigation, unless
the terms of the grant clearly denote the intention to stop at the
edge or margin of the river. If the same person be the owner on
both sides of the river, he owns the whole river to the extent of
the length of his lands upon it: Vol. 3, Com. 427-8. And this
title to the middle of the stream includes the water, the bed and
all islands: 2 Hilliard Real Prop. 92; Angell on Watercourses,
sect. 5.
This rule of the common law has been adopted in this state, and
is here the settled doctrine. It was' so held in Middleton v.
Pritchard,3 Scam. 510, and Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill. 179, with
regard to the Mississippi river where it bounds this state. In
Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Ill. 488, as to Rock river; City of ChicfoGinn, 51
cago v. Laflin, 49 Id. 172, and City of Chicago v.
Id. 266, in regard to the Chicago river.
The Calumet river, then, being non-tidal, and plaintiff owning
lands on both sides of it, he is the owner of the whole of the
bed of the stream to the extent of the length of his lands upon
it.
The next question respects the ownership of ice formed over the
bed of the river passing through the land.
It is objected to by defendant that water in a running stream is
not the property of any man; that no proprietor has a property in
the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along. But
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manifestly different considerations apply to water in a running
stream when in a liquid state and when "frozen.
In Aqawam Canal Co. v. Edwards, 36 Conn. 497, it is said:
"The principle contained in the maxim, 'aujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad ecelum,' gives to a riparian owner an interest in a stream
which runs over his land. But it is not a title to the water; it is
a usufruct merely, a right to use it while passing over the land.
The same right pertains to the land of every other riparian proprietor on the same stream and its tributaries; and as each has a.
similar and usufructuary right, the common interest requires that
the right should-be exercised and enjoyed by each in such a
reasonable manner as not to injure unnecessarily the right of any
other owner, above or below." *
In -lliot v. Fitcl urg Railroad Co., 10 Cush. 191, SHAw, 0.
J., says: "The right to flowing water is now well settled, to be a
right incidlent to property in the land; it is a right, publici juris,
of such character, that whilst it is common and equal to all through
whose land it runs, and no one can obstruct or divert it, yet, as
one of the beneficial gifts of Providence, each proprietor has a
right to a just and reasonable use of it as it passes through his
land; and so long as it is not wholly obstructed or diverted, or no
large appropriation of the water running through it is made, then
a just and reasonable use of it cannot be said to be wrongful or
injurious to a proprietor lower down. * * * Still, the rule is the
same, that each proprietor has a right to the reasonable use of it
for his own benefit for domestic use, and for manufacturing and
agricultural purposes."
In Rex v. Wharton, 12 Mod. 510, HoLT, 0. J., says: "If a
river run contiguously between the land of two persons, each of
them is of common right owner of that part of the river which is
next his land." Itilliard says, "that a watercourse is regarded
in law as a part of the land over which it flows :" 2 Hilliard Real
,Prop. 150.
It will thus be seen that the riparian owner, as such, has rights
with respect to the water in a running stream ; he has a right of
use, which right authorizes the actual taking of a reasonable
quantity of the water for -his purposes. The limitation in extent
of the use of the water is, that it shall not interfere with the public right of navigation, nor in a substantial degree diminish and
impair the right of use of the water by a lower or upper proprietor
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as it passes along his land. The only opposing rights are such
rights of the public and such upper and lower proprietors. But
when the water becomes congealed and is in that state, these opposite rights are in nowise concerned. The ice may be used and
appropriated without detriment to the right of navigation by the
public, or to other riparian owners' right of use of the water of
the stream, when flowing over their land. The just and reasonable
use of the water which belongs to the riparian proprietor, would
be, in such case of congealed state of the water, the unlimited use
and appropriation of the ice by him, as it would be no interference
with rights of others.
We. are of opinion there is such latter right of use, and that it
should be held property of which the riparian owner cannot be
deprived by a mere wrongdoer. When water has congealed and
becomes attached to the soil, why should it not, like any other
accession, be considered part of the realty ? Wherein, in this
regard, should the addition of ice formed over the bed of a stream
be viewed differently from alluvion, which is the addition made to
land by the washing of the sea or rivers ? We do not perceive
why there is not as much reason to allow to the riparian owner the
same right to take ice as to take fish, which latter is an exclusive
right in such owner. In )Jlc~arlin v. Essex Co., 10 Cush. 309,
SHAW, C. J., remarked: "It is now perfectly well established as
the law of this Commonwealth, that in all waters not fiavigable in
the common-law sense of the term, that is, in all waters above the
flow of the tide, the right of fishing is in the owner of the soil
upon.which it is carried on, and in such rivers that the right of
soil is in the owner of the land bounding upon it. If the same
person owns the land on both sides, the property in the soil is
wholly in him, subject to certain duties to the public; and if different persons own the land on opposite sides, each is proprietor of
the soil under the water to the middle thread of the river." "The
riparian proprietor has the sole right, unless he has granted it, to
fish with nets or seines in connection with his own land :" Ang.
on Watercourses, sept. 67. In Adams v. Pease, 2 qonn. 481, it
was held that the owners of land adjoining the Connecticut river
above the flowing and ebbing of the tide, have an exclusive right
of fishing opposite to their land to the middle of the river, and
that the public have an easement in thd river as a highway for
passing and repassing with .every kind of water craft. So seaweed
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thrown upon the shore belongs to the owner of the soil upon which
it is cast: Enman v. Turnbull, 2 Johns. R. 313.
The exclusive right in the owner to take the ice formed over the
land is an analogous right to those other ones which are acknowledged to exist in the subjects which have been mentioned and
may, with like propriety, be recognised. It is connected with, and
in the nature of, an accession to the land, being an increment
arising from formations over it, and belonging to the land properly,
as being included -in it, in its indefinite extent upwards. Ice,
from its general use, has come to be a merchantable commodity of
value, and the traffic in it quite an important business. It would
not be in the interest of peace and good order, nor consist with
legal policy, that such an article should be held a thing of common right and be left the subject of general scramble, leading to
acts of force and violence. In reference to the rule which we here
adopt, of assigning to the owner of the bed of a stream property
in the ice which forms over it, we may well use as fitly applying to
it the language of HOSMER, J., in Adams v. Pease, supra, in
speaking of the common-law rule as to the right of fishing, viz. :
"The doctrine of the common law, as I have stated it, promotes
the grand ends of civil society, by pursuing that wise and orderly'
maxim of assigning to everything capable of ownership a legal
and determinate owner." In accordance with these views, we
hold, as it was held in State v. Pottmeyer, 33 Ind. 402, that when
the water of a flowing stream, running in its natural channel is
congealed, the ice attached to the soil constitutes a part of the
land and belongs to the owner of the bed of the stream, and be
has the right to prevent its removal. See, further, relative to the
subject, Miyer v. Whitaker, 55 How. Pr. Rep. 876; Lorman v.
Benson, 8 Mich. 18 ; Mill River Woollen AYIanf. Co. v. Smith, 34
Conn. 462; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y. 519.
Defendant claims that it committed no trespass in taking the
ice, because the ice in the midst of a stream navigable in fact is
naturally an obstruction to navigation, and that any one has the
right, having obtained access independent of the riparian owner,
to enter upon the ice and remove it. We said in Braxon v. Bressler, above cited, "where the river is navigable, the public have an
easement, or a right of passage upon it as a highway, but not the
right to remove the rock, gravel or soil, except as necessary to the
enjoyment of the easement." The same is said as to the ice here.
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But it was not removed as necessary for the enjoyment of the
public easement of navigation,-it was. for the purpose only of the
appropriation of it for defendant's gain.
As to the instruction as to the measure of damages, we think the
case is analogous to those where coal is taken from the soil, and
that the instruction is sustained by former decisions of this court
in those cases: Ill. & St. L. Bailroad Co. v. Ogle, 92 Ill. 353 ;
McLean Coal Co. v. Lennon, 91 Id. 61; ll. & St. L. Railroad
(o. v. Ogle, 82 Id. 627; McLean Coal Co. v. Land, 81 Id. -359;
Robertson v. Jones, 71 Ill. 405. Perceiving no error in the giving or refusing of instructions by the Circuit Court, the judgment
of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
By the common law, the limit of exelusive private ownership on waters
where the tide ebbed and flowed was
high water mark; and, except as modified by statute or custom, such appears
to be the rule in the United States. See
Cooley on Torts 321, and cases cited.
As to rivers above the ebb and flow of
the tide, but navigable in fact, such as
the Mississippi and other large rivers,
there is some difference of opinion. By
the common law, the title of the riparian
owner on a stream above tide-water
prima facie extended to the centre of
the stream , and this rule hs been held
in this country to apply to such rivers
as the Detroit, the Delaware, the Connecticut, the Mississippi, the Milwaukee,
the Sault St. Maric, the Saginaw, the
Sandusky, the Chicago, Rock River,
and many others: Lorman v. Banson, 8
Mich. 18; Rundle v. Delaware, 6-c.,
Canal Co., 1 Wall., Jr., 294 ; Hart v.
Hill, I Whart. 124; Adams v. Pease, 2
Conn. 481 ; Morgan v. Reading, 11 Miss.
366; M1agnolia v. Alarshall, 39 Id. 110;
Schurineierv. St. Paul,6c., RailroadCo.,
10 Minn. 82; Houck v. Yates, 82 Ill.
179 ; Arnold v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 509 ;
Ryan v. Brown, 18 Mich. 196; Bay
Citi; Gaslight Co. v. Industrial Works,
28 Id. 182 ; Gavit v. Chamaers, 3 Ohio

496; Chicago v. Lajlin, 49 fIl. 172;
Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Id. 488.
On the other hand, in Iowa, North
Carolina, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and
perhaps in other states, it has been held
that thu soil under rivers navigable in
fact, though not subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, does not belong to the
riparian owner, but to the state: McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 ; Tomlin
v. Dubuque, 6-c.,. Railroad Co., 32 Id.
106; Houghton v. Chicago, 6-c., Railway
Co., 47 Id. 370; M1usser v. Hershey, 42
Id. 356 ; State v. Glen, 7 Jones (Law)
321 ; Wilson v. Forbes, 2 Dcv. 30;
Benson v. Morrow, 61 Mo. 345; Hickey
v. Hazard, 3 Mo. App. 480; Shrunk v.
Schuylkill Nav. Co., 14 S. & R. 71 ;
Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475.
The
same rule has also been laid down by
the Snpreme Court of the United States :
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; Railroad Co. v. Schurmeir, 7 Wall. 272.
In those states where the title of the
riparian owner extends to the centre of
the stream, in running out the side lines
of his property, they are to be extended
from their respective terminion the shore,
at right angles with the general course
of the river, to the centre of the stream,
unless otherwise established by the terms
of the grant or conveyance under which
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he holds: Knight v. Wilder, 2 Cash.
198; Clark v. Campau, 19 Mich. 325.
And the boundary-lines of watel lots
fronting on a river in such a manner
that their side lines strike the shore at a
right angle with the middle thread of
the stream, but at a different angle with
the shore at that point, extend into the
river at a right angle with the thread of
the stream, without reference to the shapc
of the shore: Bay City Gaslight Co. v.
Industrial Works, 28 Mich. 182.
Where the common-law rule prevails,
the right of the owner to the land under
the water is subject only to the public
easement of navigation and the right of
improvement for that purpose: and be
may make any beneficial use of his right
that the nature of the property will admit without injuring the rights of the
public. Thus, in Lorman v. Benson, 8
Mich. 18, it was held that the right to
raft logs down the Detroit river did not
involve the right of booming them upon
private property for safe keeping and
storage ; and that, the own,,r of the bank
being entitled to every bereficial use of
the soil under the river which could be
exercised with a due regard to the public easement, such obstructiou which
prevented his taking ice gave him a
right of action in trespass for the damages thereby occasioned.
So, as held in The State v. Pottmeyer,
30 Ind. 287 ; s. o., 33 Id. 402, and in
the principal case, it follows, as a legitimate, consequence of the rule, that the
ice upon the surface of the stream constitutes a part of the land, and may be
taken exclusively by the riparian owner.
See, also, Cummings v. Barrett, 10 Cush.
186. The owner of the fe.. of land adjoining a canal has also been held en-

titled to take ice therefrom, if the taking
does not interfere with navigation or the
use of the water for h5'draulic purposes:
Edgerton v. Hui 26 Ind. 36. In Mill
River JVoollen 11amfacturingCo. v. Smith,
34 Conn. 462, and 31er v. Whitakcer, 55
Hlow. Pr. 376, the owner of water in a
mill-pond was held entitled to the ice as
against the owner of the land. In both
of these cases, however, the plaintiffs
owned the water of the ponds, having
acquired by contract the exclusive and
absolute right to use the same as against
the owner of the land or those claiming
under him, and the caste are to be distinguished by this fact from those above
cited.
In Missouri, where it is held that the
soil under rivers navigable in fact does
not belong to the riparian proprietor, it
was held that a person who had surveyed, marked and staked off ice upon
the Mississippi river, unappropriated by
another, and who had expended money
to preserve it and make it valuable for
use as a commercial commodity, had a
possession sufficient to support an action
of trespass against one who with force
and arms drove him and his servants
away; and took and carried away the
ice : Bickey v. Hazard, 3 Mo. App. 480.
See, also, Hittingerv. Eamnes, 121 Mass.
539. And, doubtless, in thdt and other
states where the rights of the riparian
proprietor do not extend to the ownership of the soil under the water, the
doctrine of the principal case will have
no application ; but where the commonlaw rule as to non-navigable rivers has
been adopted, the rule of the principal
case will doubtless prevail.
MARSHALL D. EwELL.
Chicago.
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An Act of the Tennessee legislature to settle and compromise the bonded indebtedness of the state, which provided for the issuing of new bonds, the coupons
on which should be receivable in payment of all taxes and debts due the state,
except for taxes for the support of the common school fund, is unconstitutional.
The courts cannot enjoin the execution of a statute to fund a public debt because
of alleged bribery of members of the legislature to pass it.
Where a statute forbids suits against a state or any of'its officers, to reach the
state, it does not prevent a taxpayer from enjoining an officer who is about to issue
the'bonds of the state in pursuance of authority conferred by an unconstitutional
enactment.
APPEAL from the decree of the chancellor dismissing a bill filed by a
number of citizens and taxpayers against the secretary of state, the comptroller of the treasury, and the state treasurer, constituting " The Funding Board." The bill set forth, that on April 5th 1881, the legislature
of Tennessee passed an act entitled, "An Act to compromise and settle
the bonded indebtedness of the state of Tennessee," which provided
for funding the bonded indebtedness of the state with past due interest
up to July 1881, by new bonds, to be issued through the agendy of a
"Funding Board."
These bonds were to be coupon bonds, bearing
interest at the rate of three per cent. By the 3d section it was provided, "that the coupons on said compromise bonds, on and after
their maturity, shall be receivable in payment for all taxes and debts
due the state, except for taxes for the support of the common school
fund, and said coupons shall show upon their face that they are so
receivable."
By section 5, it was provided, that the secretary of state, comptroller and state treasurer should constitute a board, to be designated a
funding board, which was authorized when any legally issued bonds of
the state or coupons were presented to it, to examine and audit the
same, and if found genuine, to prepare and deliver to the holders compromise bonds, taking up the old bonds.
On May 25th 1881, complainants filed their bill against the Funding
Board, alleging that the passage of the act was procured by fraud and
bribery, and that the act itself was unconstitutional, and praying for an
injunction to restrain respondents from issuing the compromise bonds.
The chancellor dismissed the bill, and an appeal was taken from his
decree.
-Henry 'raft, A. S. Marks, David Campbell, N. N. Cox, George
Gantt, S. A, Champion, T. A. Talliaferro and John J. Vertrees, for
complainants.
Tlwmas 1. Mahoze,- William M. Smith, Ed. Baxter, SpL Hill,
for respondents.
R2. MoPhail Smith and David Bright,
A separate opinion was delivered by each of the judges.
given below is by
VOL. XXX.-41

The one
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MCFARLAND, J.-The object of the bill is to prevent the execution of an act passed by the General Assembly on the 5th of April,
authorizing the funding by the issuance of new bonds of mhuch the
larger part of the present bonded indebtedness of the state. The
aggregate of the new bonds thus to be issued, it is said, will be about

twenty-seven millions of dollars.
Among other things, the bill charges that suits were.pending against
certain railroad corporations of the state, brought by holders of Tennessee bonds, claiming a lien on the roads, and that during the session of
the last General Assembly a conspiracy was formed between said bondholders and said railroad corporations to procure the passage of the act
in question, with the understanding that in such event the bonds would
be funded and the suits against the railroads dismissed, and that for
the purpose of carrying out this scheme a large and powerful lobby vas
organized and supplied with large sums of money and bonds, to corrupt
and control the legislature, and procure that body to pass the law in
violation of their pledges to the people and of the people's wishes, and
that various improper influences were brought to bear upon members
of the legislature, and that the final passage of the bill through the
senate by a majority of one vote was procured by bribing two of the
senators who voted for it, one receiving $10,000 and the other $15,000
for his vote.
The question is whether this court has jurisdiction of this question.
I am satisfied, upon the most careful consideration, that it has not.
This seems to be manifest from the organization of our fbrm of government. The government of the state is divided into three departmentsthe Executive, Legislative and Judicial. The three combined represent the entire sovereignty of the state. Powers vested exclusively in
one department cannot be rightfully exercised by the other. The
legislative power is certainly vested in the General Assembly, and it is

certain that the courts can exercise no part of the power, nor can either
of these departments rightfully determine with what degree of fidelity
the other has met its obligations. For this court to exercise the jurisdiction would be to assume that tie co-ordinate departments of the
government are liable to corruption, but the courts are not.
If we were to take jurisdiction and determine that this act was.
passed by bribery and corruption the legislature would have the same
right to inquire whether or not our judgment was procured by the
same means. These departments within their spheres are so far
omnipotent that they possess all the power of the state belonging to
that department, and in the exercise of these powers they are independent, neither being subject to the will or supervision of the other.
The members of the General Assembly, like the members of this
court, are responsible to the people who elected them for the manner in
which they discharge their trusts, and they may be impeached in the
manner pointed out by the Constitution. The people" may relieve
themselves of the consequences of the corrupt and faithless acts of
their representatives, but it was never contemplated that one department should sit in judgment upon the conduct of the other. If so we
might set aside pardons granted by the executive upon the ground that
they were corruptly granted, and the executive department might in
turn refuse to permit our judgments to-be executed upon the ground
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that they were corruptly rendered, and from the collision and conflict,
confusion and chaos would result. If we should take jurisdiction of
this question, and an issue of fact be formed, it would then have to be
tried upon the rules of testimony applicable to civil cases, only a preponderance would be necessary to establish the allegations of the bill,
or, as held by a majority of this court, only a slight preponderance, so'
that if it be shown by a slight preponderance of testimony that one of
the senators who voted for the bill was corrupted, we would then be
compelled to declare that the act was not the will of the legislature,
although it could not appear that the bribed member would not have
voted for the bill, notwithstanding the bribe, and although the bill
was passed with all the forms of the law.
And besides this result would be reached in a case to which neither
the state or the impeached member is a party or has the right to be
heard and where we would have no right to consider whether improper
influences may have affected the other side of the controversy.
The ground upon which courts set aside unconstitutional laws, as we
shall hereafter see, is wholly different. In such cases the courts simply
determine whether there is conflict between the two laws-the constitutional and the legislative acts-and if so, the former must prevail.
The remedy when the passage of a law has been improperly obtained
is to repeal it either by the same or by some succeeding legislature, and
the wrong sustained in the meantime is generally not irreparable, and
besides the remedy by repealing the, law can be more promptly applied
by the legislature than by the court. The correctness of this view as
to ordinary legislation is conceded by the counsel for the complainants,
but it is insisted that, as to contracts entered into by the legislature in
behalf of the state, the rule must be different; that when a state contracts she lays aside her sovereignty and contracts as an individual, and
all the consequences must result-that is to say, as the contracts of
individuals may be set aside for fraud, the contracts of states are subject to the same rule. When courts acquire jurisdiction of contracts
made by states they apply the same rules of construction to the state
they do to the individual; give the same measure of justice to each.
But it is a mistake to assume that in making contracts the state lays
,aside her sovereignty so as to give the courts jurisdiction without her
consent to adjudge her liability. The state needs no such assistance
from the courts. If the legislature has been bribed and corrupted to
assmne obligatiobs that the state does not rightfully owe, the remedy is,
in the first place, to repeal the law before the contracts are complete.
This power with respect to the present law is now fully possessed by
the governor and legislature. If satisfied that the law was procured by
bribery it is a question for the consideration of the governor as to
whether or not he will call the legislature together on the subject, and
for that body to determine whether for this or*for any other reason the
law should be repealed. It does not meet the question to say that they
will not perform this duty; they have the power, we have not.
And even after the law had been executed and the bonds issued, if
it should appear that by'corruption and bribery an unjust debt has
been assumed in the name of the state, its good faith and honor would
not require the obligation to be met, and whether it would or not would be
a question for the people through their representatives to consider, as the
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state is sovereign and cannot be coerced, so that whether future legislatures would recognise the obligation would be a question for them,
and the people in their sovereign capacity need no relief from the
courts.
But it is said that on account of a peculiar provision of the act
known as the "coupon feature" it will, when executed, be irreparable,
and the state for reasons hereafter to be considered then without
remedy, and hence unless the courts now interfere the obligations
entered into under a law thus enacted will be fastened upon the people
and no means left by which they can resist them. I will consider this
question when I come to the constitutionality of the "coupon feature,"
and it will then appear that in my view there is a remedy against such
an emergency, but not the remedy we are now considering.
To assume the jurisdiction now insisted upon would not only be, as I
think, wholly unauthorized upon principle, but directly in the face of
all the judicial opinions that have been expressed upon the subject,'
which, considering the sources from which these opinions have emanated, it would be bold if not rash to disregard. I. refer to Chief
Justice MARSHALL in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87; Sunbury & Erie
Railroad Co. v. Coop.cr, 33 Penn. St. 283 ; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind.
298; MfCulloch v. The State, 11 Id. 424; .E parte Newman, 9
Cal. 515; Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. .612; State v. H ays, 49 Mlo. 604;
People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532.
. There is scarcely to be found an.intimation to the contrary. Whether
a bill may be maintained to restrain individuals or corporations from
receiving the benefits of their own fraud practised upon the legislature
need not be considered, as I do not think this bill can take that shape
as the bondholders or those supposed to be benefited by the law are not
parties-the .Funding Board only being defendants.
I come now to consider whether the act violates the Constitution of
the state. Several objections have been taken to it on this ground, but
the argument has been addressed mainly to what is known as the
" coupon feature" of the act, and the question, in importance, undoubtedly overshadows all others. The bonds authorized by the act, as I
have said, will aggregate twenty-seven millions of dollars. They are to
run for ninety.nine years from the 1st of July 1881, redeemable at the
pleasure of the state at any time after five years; they are to bear
interest at the rate of three per cent. per annum, evidenced by coupons
payable semi-annually in New York.
The third section provides that the coupons on and after the maturity
shall be receivable in payment of all taxes and debts due the state,
except for taxes for the support of the common schools and the payment
of the interest on the common school fund, and said coipons shall show
upon their face that they are so receivable. The ninth section enacts
that the bonds shall be substantially in the form there set out. The
form of the bond there set out contains this provision, to wit, "The
coupons of the bonds as they become due are receivable for all taxes
and debts due the state of Tennessee." T will not. stop to consider the
effects of the discrepancy between the third section and the form of the
bonds set out in the ninth section, the former making the coupons
receivable for all taxes and debts, with certain exceptions, the latter
making them so receivable without exception. I will assume that the
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third section is to prevail. The purpose of these provisions is manifest.
The stipulation that the coupons are receivable for taxes and debts
due the state, especially as incorporated into the bonds and coupons
themselves, will, if valid, constitute part of the contract, and will
be within the protection of the clauses of the Constitution of the
United States prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, a provision which the federal courts have jurisdiction
to enforce, and this notwithstanding the Constitution of the United
States denies to those courts jurisdictiofi of such suits directly against
the states. The federal courts take jurisdiction of the officers of
the state and enforce this provision of the Constitution, notwithstanding the contract to be enforced be the contract of a state and the state
be the real party in interest.
This is the well-settled law of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Osborne v. U. S. Bankc, 9 Wheat. 738 ; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18
How. 331: Banks v. Debolt, Id. 300; Furman v. Niclhol, 8 Wall. 44;
Hartman v. Greenlhow, 12 Otto 672 ; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, and
many other cases, so that if the act be within the power of the legislature and the bonds be issued, the provision in regard to the receivability of the coupons for taxes and debts due the state cannot be
repealed so as to affect the holder's right during the ninety-nine years,
or so long as any coupons remain unpaid, and any attempt to so repeal
must b'edeclared inoperative and void by the courts of the state
in obedience to the mandate of the federal courts. The holders of the
bonds and coupons, therefore, would have this security, that so long as
each successive legislature shall levy any tax, especially any tax over
and above taxes for the support of common schools and interest on the
school fund, they would have the prior right to appropriate it before it
reached the treasury by tendering the coupons in payment. The
result, therefore, wbuld be that no future legislature could, on any
account, omit to levy the necessary tax to pay the outstanding coupons
in addition to the current expenses and other debts of the state, and
besides, when so levied, the holders of the coupons would have a prior
claim on the whole fund, and whatever loss or delay might occur would
fall or be liable to fall upon the other current expenses and debts
of the state. Future legislatures would have no other alternative
unless they refused to levy the necessary taxes to support the government., - In short, the effect of the act is to place the question of the
payment of these coupons and the manner of their payment beyond
the control of any future legislature or even of the people 'themselves
in convention assembled for ninety-nine years, if any portion of the
coupons remain unpaid so long, and to take from such legislature all
right to control the revenues raised by them to the extent of the sum
necessary to pay the coupons or over eight hundred thousand dollars
annually, and further to vest in the federal court jurisdiction to enforce
the demand. The objection is not to the power of the legislature 'to
make by law coupons receivable for taxes. This power is not denied.
The objection is to the power to stipulate by contract that the law shall
not be repealed. The question is, has one legislature the power
to make such a stipulation binding upon any future legislature? I do
not favor the doctrine that courts.may declare acts of the legislature
void upon the idea that they violate in some general and undefined
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way the principles of republican government. I also adhere to the doctrine that in general state constitutions are to be construed as limiting
and restricting, 'but not as granting legislative powers. If the power
be in its nature legislative, then it beloogs to the legislative department,
unless some limit or restriction be found either in the letter or spirit of
the Constitution. And in applying these limits and restrictions I have
never been disposed to "stick in the bark," or to be too literal
or hypercritical in construing the Constitution. But when I regard'
a vital principle violated, then'I deem it my duty to declare the act
inoperative, without resorting-out of mere deference to the legislature-to extreme or refined subtleties to sustain it.
I take it to be a sound and well-recognised principle, plainly deducible from our Constitution, that the legislative power vested in each
General Assembly as the representatives Qf the people to legislate upon
any subject, is limited to the two years for which they are elected, and
it is clearly beyond their power to enact any law on any subject that
may not be repealed by the same or any subsequent General Assembly.
This I take to be a self-evident proposition, and one that will not be
denied. One generation cannot legislate for the next.
The people through their representatives have at all times the right
to change their laws to meet the exigencies as they arise.
But while this is admitted it is maintained that legislative enactment
may also involve elements of contract that cannot be changed' at the
will of the sovereign power. The laws may be repealed but the obligation of contracts cannot be impaired.
Irrepealable laws may not be passed, but states may make contracts
obligatory upon the people in the future. This is beyond question.
By the custom of civilized nations they have the right to contract publie debts not only obligatory upon the people who contract the debt,
but upon future generations, otherwise they might in times of war be
unable to preserve the life of the nation itself. But states in creating
such debts act as sovereigns and cannot be coerced into payment. The
faith, honor and credit of the state and of the people are pledged for
the payment of the debt, but the people through their representatives
in each successive legislature must be left to redeem their part of the
pledge. It is not contended that there is any mode to coerce the state
into the payment of an ordinary bond-I mean one without the " coupon
feature ;" but it is equally certain, as has been shown, that there is a
mode by which payment of coupons of the character we are considering
may be enforced.
The provision in regard to the coupon is not only a law regulating
the collection and disbursement of the revenue and the conduct of the
state officers, but under the construction put upon similar provisions
by the Supreme Court of the United States it becomes part of the contract. The question, therefore, is : Can one legislature, in the form of
a law, make a contract which surrenders the power of future legislatures
to enact laws for the public good ? Can one legislature surrender those
attributes of sovereignty which are absolutely necessary not only to the
well-being of the state but to its very existence ? Stated in this form
there cab be but one answer. No such power can or ought to exist.
The power from time to time to enact such laws for the public good, as
may then appear necessary, is an essential element of sovereignty abso-
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lutely necessary for the existence and well-being of the state and cannot
be surrendered. But it is said if this proposition be carried to its full
length it denies to the state the power to issue bonds in any form,
That the power to bind the state by the "coupon feature" of the law
is no higher power than to issue an ordinary bond. That in each case
the faith, honor and credit of the state and its future revenues are
pledged for the payment of the principal and interest of the debt, and
nothing beyond this in either case. If the power exists to make one
form of bond, it must exist to make the other, as the power to provide
the manner of payment must be co-extensive with the power to create
the debt. If the obligation contained in the "coupon feature" be
allowed to stand upon the same basis as the bond without this feature,
that is upon the faith and honor of the state, and bear the same construction, then this assumption might be correct. When questions of this character were first brought before the Federal court, it was insisted that
the clause of the Federal Constitution prohibiting states from passing.
laws- impairing the obligations of contracts, related to contracts of
individuals, and that mere legislative acts of the state should not be
construed as contracts which the Federal courts were vested with jurisdiction to enforce against the states, especially when by the Constitution
the court could not take jurisdiction directly. Had this construction
prevailed, then the form of obligation entered into by the state would
not be very material. The state being sovereign could not be coerced
to perform the obligation in either event, and, in making such contract
no higher power would be exercised in the one case than the other.
But, as we have seen the decision of the question was otherwise; it was
held that when provisions like the present are enacted, as to the manner
of payment, the Federal court will take jurisdiction of the state's officers
and enforce the law, as a contract, denying the state all right to repeal
or impair it, and virtually in that event the state ceases to be sovereign
in respect to her own obligations, and hence in making such contracts
the state has surrendered her rights not only to act as a sovereign with
respect to her own obligations, but also to enact such laws as may incidentally affect them. And we must bear in mind that by the construction thus given to acts similar in this respect to the coupon feature
of this act, the law out of which the contract results becomes irrepealable.
The difference, theiefore, between the two characters of bonds is this:
The ordinary bond pledges the honor and fiith of the state; each successive legislature as the representative of the people is left to meet its
part of the obligation; in doing so they act from the sense of honor
and good faith which is supposed to actuate the people of a sovereign
state and their representatives. It is for them to determine what honor
and good faith require, but there can be no power to coerce their action.
They are not bound by previous legislation further than honor and good
faith require they should be bound, and of this they are to judge. By
the issuance of the ordinary bonds the power to legislate in the future
for the public good is in no sense relinquished. On the other hand,
the bonds with the coupon feature not only pledge the honor and faith
of the state, but practically take the matter entirely out of the control
of the people or any future legislature, while the obligations last, nob
only as to the question whether the coupons shall be paid, but also
as to the manner of their payment. The revenues to be raised by
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future legislatures are to this extent not only pledged but actually
appropriated and put. beyond their control. To this extent they are
deprived of all power of legislating on the subject. So it is apparent
that the powers exercised in the two cases are essentially different. Had
the legislature the power by contract to place the coupon provision of
the laws absolutely beyond repeal while the coupons remain unpaid ?
It is said the question can never arise unless we suppose that future
legislatures may disregard their obligations and refuse to levy the
necessary taxes to meet the interest on the debt and othgr expenses of
the state. Without this the necessity for a repeal can never exist, and
it cannot be presumed that they will thus disregard their duty. I agree
that we are to predicate no argument upon a presumption that any
future legislature will violate its duty or act in bad faith. But the
error of this argument is in the court assuming to decide that it will
under all circumstances be the duty of every succeeding legislature to
.levy taxes to pay the coupons. This is not a question for the court.
If a future legislature should become satisfied that the debt was unjust
and fraudulent, procured by bribery and corruption, the honor and fhith
of the state would no,; require that it be paid. Of this the legislature
would have to judge. It is said that this debt is an honest and just
debt. If so, I trust the legislative department- will always so recognise
it. I certainly intend to express no doubt as to its validity, but the
court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question. The state as a
sovereign power must determine for itself through its legislature the
measure of justice that good faith requires it to render to its creditors.
Of course the state has the power to repudiate an honest debt, but
we are to presume that, the power will not be exercised. But, however
just and honest this debt may be, if one legislature has the power thus
to tie the hands of the future legislatures, as to the payment of honest
debts, they may equally bind them for the payment of unjust debts.
It is perhaps not impossible that legislatures may be bribed and corrupted
to enter into obligations that ought not to be binding upon the people
of tl~e state. In such an event the state could not go into the courts
to set aside its obligations upon the ground that its own legislature had
been bribed and corrupted, and when the action of the Federal courts
should be invoked to enforce the coupon contract and protect it from
impairments, they would not listen to the charge that the state legislature had been bribed to make the contract, so that in such an event
the state could practically no more resist the payment of a debt created
by bribery than any other.
But aside from this, and assuming that no future legislature will ever
doubt that this is a just debt, will it under all circumstances be their
duty to levy taxes to pay the coupons ? Public debts are to be paid by
taxation ; the creditbr has no direct claim against the citizen. I do not
undertake to define the extent to which the taxing power may go. But
the right of the people and of the state to exist is superior to the claim
of the creditor. The creditor who takes the bond of a sovereign government risks not only its honor and good faith but als6 the possibility
that its debt may become too onerous to be borne. The government
must exist, its people must live, otherwise all ability to pay debts would
be destroyed, and whatever may be said of it, we know that upon the
supposed want of ability to pay or for other cause the power to repudiate
public debts, in whole or in part, has been frequently exercised in
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mdern times even by the most enlightened governments. These are
inirmities attaching to Al debts of this character.
But I am not to be understood as advocating the doctrine of repudiation or encouraging any tendency in that direction. I only assert that
the right of the state to preserve its own existence and good government
and the right of the people to support and maintain themselves is
superior to the right of the creditor. This principle is recognised even
in regard to private contracts, by our liberal exemption laws. In the
event of war, famine or pestilence, is it possible- that a legislature would
not have the power to suspend the payment of these coupons, or postpone
them to the superior demand for the preservation of the state and the
people themselves? In such an event I do not think it can be denied
that the power to repeal the laws would exist. We cannot know that
such emergencies may not arise within the next ninety-nine years. It
will not do to say that the legislature that passed this act determined
that no such emergency would ever arise, and that it would never be
necessary to repeal it; this is absurd.
It is said that such emergencies are improbable, extreme cases that
may never occur, and that we nedd not now undertake to provide
against them. True, we need not; but we must. preserve in the government the power to provide for such emergencies if they should
occur, the power to protect itself and its people in times of calamity
and peril. Extrere cases may always be supposed in order to test
principles. This is not arguing that the act in question may become
unconstitutional upon such future contingency. The happening of such
future contingency is referred to for the purpose of showing that the
act was in excess of legislative power at the time it was passed. Then,
if it be conceded that, under any emergency that may reasonably be
supposed, the power to repeal the law would exist, then it seems to me
to follow, inevitably, that the act which, according to the construction
placed upon such acts, stipulates that it shall not be repealed was beyond legislative power.
It will not do to say that the legislature might make such a contract,
but that we will annex to it the implied qualification, that upon sufficient emergency the law may be repealed and the contract impaired.
This qualification necessarily destroys the whole contract. If the law
may be repealed in any emergency, then who is to judge of the sufficiency of the emergency? Certainly not the courts; it cannot be said
that the courts would uphold a repeal of the act if, in their opinion, it
was upon an emergency justifying it, and disregard the repeal if the
emergency was not deemed sufficient.
The considerations upon which the sufficiency of the emergency would
have to be determined are not judicial in their character, but purely
political and legislative. If then we consider that the sufficiency of the
emergency is to be determined by the legislature, it inevitably results
that they may repeal the law at pleasure and the contract is without
validity.
But it seems to me, that if the power to make such contracts be conceded them, the right to repeal the law and abrogate the contract
would not be recognised in any emergency. The question would come
directly within the jurisdiction of the federal court. The decisions of
that court, at least as they now stand, leave no room for doubt. They
VOL. XXX.-42
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say, if the state legislature makes the contract and has the -power to
make it. then it cannot be impaired by any subsequent legislation, and
to ascertain the meaning of the contract, they disregard the construction of the state courts and construe it for themselves.
The court would not undertake to inquire into the circumstances of
emergency or necessity under which the state legislature may have
undertaken to repeal the law and impair the contract. It is said, however, that the jurisdi3tion is vested in that. court, and whatever it might
decide would be the 'aw of the case, and we must presume they would
delcide correctly.
Jurisdiction is vested in that court to enfbrce the Federal Constitution
against state laws impairing the obligations of contracts, and so it must
determine whether the contract has been impaired. Their decisions
are the supreme law upon this subject.
But whether our legislature has the power to bind the state by the
contract, supposed. to be impaired, is not a question for the Federal
Supreme Court. This is a question depending upon the construction
of our own Constitution and belongs to this court. If our Constitution
denies to the legislature the power*to make the contract, and this courp
so declare, I do not understand that the Federal Supreme Court has
any jurisdiction to review our decision. It' is certain that it would
not if the law be declared unconstitutional, and the proposed contract
without authority, in advance and its execution prevented, whatever it
might decide in the event the question were to come up after the bonds
are issued.
So, that when it is found that legislative acts of the character of this
one are construed to be contracts by which the state is subjected to the
jurisdiction of the f~deral court, and by which its sovereign power
necessary for its own existence and well-being is surrendered, the state
court is well justified in declaring that no power exists in the legislature
to make such a contract.
The state must reserve to itself and to each succeeding legislature
the sovereign power to protect itself, and to attend to its own local
affairs; its legislature can surrender no power not already vested in the
federal government. Again, assuming that the debt will always be
regarded as a just debt and that no calamity will ever occur rendering
the people for the time unable to meet the interest, that each successive legislature will 'e willing, in good faith, to discharge the duty of
levying the necessary taxes, still, it might in their opinion be necessary for the public good to change the manner of payment, and repeal
the coupon section, collect the taxes in money, and pay the coupons at
the treasury. This might become necessary to prevent the various tax
collectors in the state, many of whom are unskilled in business, from
receiving counterfeit coupons. The delay in the collection of taxes,
even when an ample amount is levied, may, on account of the prior
claims of the coupon holders be found to operate unjustly to the other
creditors of the state, and create embarrassments for want of funds to
meet the current expenses. The legislature might desire to obviate
thisby levying a separate tax, payable in money to meet the current
expenses, leaving an ample amount payable as before in coupons to take
up all that remain outstanding.
Neither of these changes supposes any purpose to repudiate the debt.
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fhey would be perfectly fair and just and not. inconsistent with perf'et
good faith, yet if the contract be valid neither of these changes could
be made. Such changes in the laws might be necessary for the public
good, and yet the legislature of a sovereign state.without the power to
make them.
We canpot determine, nor was it in the power of the last General
Assembly to determine, that these changes would never be necessary
or important.
It is a power constituting an essential element of
sovqreignty necessary for the purposes of government and cannot be
surrendered, but must remain with the people and their representatives
for the time being. The extent of the power is not important. If one
essential element of sovereignty may be surrendered, why not all.
Where is the limit?
It is argued, however, that for a consideration a legislature 9 ay relinquish part of' the sovereign power, though not all. I know that this
doctrine is established by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States with reference to provisions in charters of incorporation, by which, for a consideration, the right to levy taxes in the future
has been held to be released.
We are bound by these decisions in similar cases, but we are not
bound to apply the same doctrine elsewhere. The soundness of the
doctrine has always been denied by some of the ablest judges of
the Supieme Court, and has been met with solemn protests by some
of the ablest state courts, and Mr. Justice MILLER has shown me one
of his dissenting opinions that if the power be conceded to exist, no
limit can be fixed to its exercise. These decisions must be left to stand
upon their own peculiar ground, if, indeed, they stand upon any sound
principles. I have carefully examined the case of Antoni v. Wright,
decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia, 22 Grattan 833, and given
to it the respectful consideration due to the courts of a sister state, but
I cannot concur in the reasoning or the conclusion. I have already
examined the grounds upon which it mainly rests.
The case of Hartman v. Greenliow, 12 Otto 672, did not present the
question. The decision in Antoni v. Wright, afterwards re-affirmed by
the same court, had been acquiesced in by the state officers of Virginia.
The coupons in the latter case were not refused, the only effort was to
deduct from them a 'ax upon the bonds. While the reasoning of the
Virginia court is recited with apparent approval, yet it is manifest,
the decision was regarded as settling the question, leaving only the
question of the proposed tax to be decided in the latter case. The case of
Furman v. Nichol, 5 Wall. 44, holds that the 12th section of'the charter of the Bank of Tennessee, making its notes receivable for taxes ivas a
contract attaching to the notes, that could not, be impaired by subsequent
legislation. The question, of course, has some analogy, but is not identical. The notes were intended to, and did for a time, at least, circulate
as money. At all events, the question as to the power of the legislature to bind the state by contract like the present, was not considered
or decided. The same may be said of Woodriff v. Trapnall, 10
How. 190.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not, in general, been
disposed to question the power of state legislatures to make such contracts. I presume, as I have said, the construction of the state
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Constitution as to the power would be a question for the state courts.
Though in inquiring whether the contracts of a state have been impaired,
the United States courts do not yield to the construction given by the
state courts to the stiatutes, out of which the contract arises: ,efferson
Bank v. Sh~elley, 1 Blaek 436; Wright v. ANagle, 11 Otto 794. We
ought to entertain no feeling of antagonism toward the Federal Supreme
Court. We should adopt its decisions where they are controlling without hesitation. We should not regard its decisions as those of a foreign
jurisdiction. It is not to be denied that the extension of the jurisdictions of the federal courts over the states is, from a political standpoint, regarded with jealousy from some quarters, as indicating a tendency to encroach upon the rights of the states and strengthen the
general government. Il this contest it is not the province of this court
to enter with anything of a partisan spirit. Upon this character of
questions, however, Mr. Justice MILLER in a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice FIELD and the Chief Justice concurred, in the case of
Vashington Uhi'ersit2i v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439, uses the language: "But
we must be permitted to say, that in deciding the * * * validity of the
contract, this court has been at times quick to discover a contract that
it might be protected, and slow to perceive that what are claimed to be
contracts are not so by reason of want of authority in those who profess to bind others."
This, he adds, has been especially apparent in regard to contracts
made by legislatures of states. When it is seen that the result, in cases
of this character is, by contract, to surrender to the federal court jurisdiction over the state itself in its local affairs, it cannot be wondered
if, in view of the statement, state courts shall hereafter be a little slow
to see the power to make such contracts. I trust, at this day, I have no
special mania upon the subject of state sovereignty, but I cannot
decline to assert so much of the powers of sovereignty as are yet conceded to the state.
It is said, however, the bill attacks the act upon the ground that the
legislature cannot pass an irrepealable act, and hence this law is repealable, and at the same time assumes that the act is unconstitutional
because it is not repealable. The argument is earnestly pressed, and it
is insisted that the law is either repealable or it is not repealable; if
it is repealable no relief is now needed, it will be for the legislature to
repeal it at pleasure; if it is not repealable the complainants are entitled
to no relief by their own showing. This, though ingenious, savors of
If the section in question was only a law it would
"special pleading."
of course be repealable, but it involves also elements of a contract, and
if the power exist to bind the state to these stipulations and the terms
be accepted, then the contract could not be impaired. As to neither
of these propositions can there be any doubt. Nor can there be any
doubt under the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that this is a
contract. No difficulty can exist as to its construction and meaning.
It was intended to prevent the repeal of the law. The question is not
whether it is or is not a contract, or as to the meaning of the contract;
but the question is whether the legislature had the power to bind the
state to these stipulations. It is not an accurate statement of the position of the complainants to say that the act is unconstitutional because
it is not repealable, but it is because it professes to authorize a contract
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on behalf of the state which the legislature has not the power to make,
that is, a contract relinquishing part of the sovereign power of the
state. Of course, if the law be unconstitutional it may be so declared
even after the bonds are issued, but it does not follow that it may not
be so declared in advance. It is assumed that the question cannot arise
until there is an attempt to repeal the law, as until then there is no real
ease. But this overlooks the fact that this is not only a law, but professes
to be a contract. If the court has the jurisdiction, and the proper
parties are before it, no doubt can exist as to the right to declare in
advance the want of power to make the contract and prevent its consummation. If such jurisdiction exists, it would, in every view, be
better to exercise it now rather than allow the bonds to 'be issued and
afterward allow the coupon section to be repealed and the contract
changed. Of course, we cannot know that the attempt would ever be
made to repeal it, but the bonds, in the form proposed,'would contain
an unwarranted assumption upon their face, and be calculated to deceive
and mislead innocent purchasers and make litigation. The Supreme
Court of the United States enjoined the board of liquidation of
Louisiana from issuing bonds of the state to certain persons, upon the
ground that an act of the legislature authorizing it indirectly impaired
the rights of the complainants under a former act; 2 Otto 531. In
Davis v. Gray, the governor of Texas was enjoined from issuing
grants to a large body of land, upon the ground that it would interfere
with other titles : 16 Wall. 203, and there are various other eases holding that it is proper to grant the relief in advance : 3itott v. Pennsylvania Railroad,30 Penn. St. 9; Bradley v. Corn , 2 Humph. 428 ; Winston v. . & P. Railroad, I Baxter 60. If this law in terms authorizes
the defendants to enter into contracts in the name of the state, containing
stipulations to which the state, under the Constitution, cannot be bound,
then there ought to be no reluctance in so declaring, or any "straining
of the timber" of the law to avoid the result. It may, no doubt, be
thought that there are strong reasons why the court ought, if possible,
to sustain the settlement. The state, it may be said, has large resources,
the debt is not beyond our means, it has been a disturbing element in
the state, the reputation of our people for honor and integrity is at
stake, and the court ought from these considerations to resolve all
doubts in favor of the law, brush aside all technicalities and abstractions
and sustain the action of the legislature if possible, because it is a
favorable settlement, and it is of great importance to the state that it
should be sustained. To defeat this settlement of the public debt, is, I
know, assuming a great responsibility. I certainly could not undertake
to do so upon a mere technicality or abstraction. I cannot, of course,
know that this law would ever injuriously affect the state, it might
not; the burdens. might be submitted to and borne without injury or
complaint. But if it involves a vital principle of constitutional law,
essential in its nature to the preservation of the state and the rights of
the people, then this principle cannot be surrendered, upon the suggesticra that in this instance it would do no harm, and that it is for a good
purpose. A radical error, once established, may do incalculable injury.
I cannot undertake to speculate as to the consequences. Mly duty is to
respond to the question presented by the record. The political considerations are not for the court. It simply resolves itself at last into
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the question whether the sovereign power of the people of this state to
deal with their public debt, to raise revenue by taxation and appropriate
it, and enact laws in regard to the manner of such collection shall
remain with them and their representatives, as they shall from time to
time assemble, or shall those powers be held tb have been surrendered
by the contract of one General Assembly for ninety-nine years, and the
jurisdiction thereby vested in the federal court to coerce the state into
the performance of the contract.
It must be remembered that if this contract be valid, the people of
the state cannot change it even by a constitutional amendment. They
cannot, even in this itode, impair the obligation.
The last General Assembly, actuated, no doubt, by a patriotic desire to
redeem the honor of the state and do justice to its creditors, undertook
to satisfy their demands by putting the obligation in such form that no
future legislature could question the settlement or change the manner
of payment. This feature of the law seems to have had its origin in a
want of confidence in the integrity of the people and their future representatives. In this I think the legislature exceeded its power. The
responsibility of making provision on the debt, the honor and good
name of the state must be left with the people. If they, in an evil
hour, should choose to violate their faith and bring reproach and dishonor upon themselves by repudiating debts that in justice they ought
to pay, it will indeed be a sad calamity, but I am not to presume that
such an event can ever occur. The people of this state cannot be
guilty of so great a folly and so great a crime ; but if they choose to do
so I do not know how they shall be prevented. One legislature has no
power to act. upon such a presumption and bind the people by a contract
which surrenders their sovereign powers.
It remains then to be seen whether the court has jurisdiction and the
necessary parties to render a decree. It is argued with great earnestness and force that the court cannot take jurisdiction of this case,
because it is in effect a suit against the state, or against "officers of the
state, acting by authority of the state, with a view to reach the state."
The Constitution allows suits against the state in such manner as the
legislature may provide, but as there is now no law providing for such
suits it is conceded that they cannot be maintained. On the contrary,
the Act of February 28th 1873, declares that no court in this state
shall have jurisdiction " to entertain any suit against the state, or
against any officer of rhe state acting by authority of the state, with a
view to reach the state, its treasury, funds or property."
We have decided quite a number of cases since this act was passed,
awarding the process of mandamus against the comptroller to compel
him to issue warrants against the state allowed by law: Burch v.
Baxter, 12 Ileiskell 601; Publising "Vo. v. Burch, Id. 607 ; Uld v.
Gaines, 4 Lea 352, besides quite a number of unreported cases. The
effect of the Act of 1873 seems to have been considered in those cases;
but it would certainly not be construed to deprive the court of jurisdiction to compel a ministerial officer to perform a plain ministerial
duty, and when the demand of the relator is allowed by law it is the
'plain ministerial duty of the comptroller to issue his warrants, even
though in determining this question the court may have to declare the
legislative acts unconstitutional. Otherwise, the decision of the comp-
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troller would be final, and the party having a demand allowed by law
without remedy. Such proceedings, so far from bing suits against
the state, are, in fact, suits in the name of the state to compel its officers
to perform their duty.
There are cases, however, where the ministerial officer is-vested with
discretion in the discharge of his duties, a discretion which the courts
cannot control. They may compel him to perform his duty, but may
not determine how his discretion shall be exercised. The principle
upon which mandamus is awarded against ministerial officers in such
cases is not that the state is coerced, or its officers compelled to perform
acts against the will of the state, but precisely the reverse. They are
compelled to perform the will of the state as expressed by law-in general, the only manner in which it can be expressed. It is claimed that
the defendants in this case are officers of the state, acting by authority
of the state, and hence cannot be interfered with in the discharge of
the duties imposed by the Act of 1881, without directly violating the
Act of 1878, above set out.
The only evidence that they are, in this matter, acting by authority
of the state, is the Act of 1881, under consideration; if it is out of the
way then they have no authority. In that view, so far from their
proposed acts being by authority of the state, they would not only
be acting without authority, but in direct violation of the will of the
state.
The state cannot be supposed to be standing behind its officer urging
the execution of an unconstitutional law, especially when there is nothing to show this but the unconstitutional law itself, otherwise a void
law for this purpose would be as effective as a valid law. But it is said
the court cannot reach the question of the validity of the law-that the
jurisdiction is defeated in limine.
It is true the court cannot take jirrisdiction of the state for any purpose, but it has undoubted jurisdiction of the defendants. The objection to the exercise of the particular jurisdiction against them is that
they are officers of the state acting by authority of the state. To determine this the court must look to their authority. It cannot accept
their mere assumption. If the authority be wanting, or the law which
they claim gives them the authority be void, then they are ndt acting.
by authority of the state. It is true they would have color of authority.
A law is primafacie valid, but if the court can look far enough to see
this much, they can look farther and see that it. is in fact void. This
rule is firmly established as respects the jurisdiction exercised by the
Supreme Court of the United States in enforcing the clause of the federal constitution against state laws impairing the obligations of contracts, even where the contract to be upheld is the contract of the state.
In such cases, although the state officers may be acting under the
authority of a law of the state prima facie valid, and, although the
11th amendment to the federal constitution prohibits the suit against
the state, yet the federal courts take jurisdiction of the officer, and if
the law of the, state under which he is acting be found to impair the
contract embraced in any previous act, the former is declared void, and
the officer is compelled to execute the law as the court may declare it.
The court says that such are not suits against the state, although the
state be the real party in interest: Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat.
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738; ,S'tate Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 Howard 369; Dodge v. Wool.
sey, 18 Id. 331 ; Bank v. Debolt, Id. 380; Jefferson Bank v. Skel1y,
1 Black 436; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace 220; Woodson v. jifurdock, 22 Id. 351; Board of.Liquidation v. Mc66mb, 2 Otto 531.
In the latter case, the board of commissioners of Louisiana, of
which the governor was a member, was restrained by injunction from
issuing bonds of the state which were expressly authorized by an act
of the legislature of Louisiana. They pleaded the authority of the act.
The court said the state could not be sued, but that an unconstitutional
law was no authority for the non-performance or violation of duty, but
would be regarded -s merely void. So, notwithstanding the act authorizing the bonds to issue, it was held to be the plain duty of the
board not to issue the bonds, and one about which they had no discretion. So, in Davis v. Cray, supra, the Governor of Texas was
restrained from issuing grants for land in the state, although expressly
authorized by an act of the legislature primafacie valid. It is said,
however, that these decisions only establish the rule of the United
States courts when exercising the jurisdiction of that court to enforce
the constitution and laws of the United States, that is to say, the
clause prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of
contracts; but when they exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
state courts dependent upon citizenship the rule is different.
In these cases first named, the rule must be the same in the state as
in the federal courts. It is as much the duty of the state as the federal
court to uphold the Constitution of the United States and declare void
all laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and for this purpose to
entertain suits against officers of the state. They cannot escape this
duty by holding a suit against the officer to be a suit against the state.
A judgment on this ground would be reversed by the federal Supreme
Court, and by its mandate the state court would be required to enter a
judgment against the officer. So that the argument insisted upon
would lead us to this conclusion-In cases involving the provisions of
both the state and federal constitutions against laws impairing the obligation of contracts, the rule would be, that a suit against an officer is not
a suit against the state. If it involve any other provision of the state
constitution the rule would be exactly the reverse. It would seem that,
upon principle, the rule ought to be uniform. We have a number of
cases in which officers and agents of the state have been restrained by
injunction from carrying out laws which result in violating the Constitution, as for instance the establishment of new counties. The leading
case on this subjecv is Bradley v. Commissioners, 2 Hum. 428, which
has been repeatedly followed. (See also, Illott v. Penna. Railroad, 30
Penn. St. 9; also Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 147; also Winston v.
T. & P. R. R., I Baxter 60.)
The cases, however, of Bradley v. Commissioners, supra, and others
of a similar character, were befare the Act of 1873, and the mandamus
cases before referred to did not consider its effect.
This question was considered in the case of the State v. Sneed, 9
Baxter 472, in which it was held that the Act of 1873 deprived the
court of jurisdiction by mandamus to compel the tax-collectors to receive
the notes of the Bank of Tennessee issued after May 1861, in accordance with the 12th section of the charter. It will be found, however,
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that the real ground upon which this decision rests is, that by another
act of the same session, chapter 44, Acts of 1873, a new remedy was
given, that is to say, to pay the taxes in money under protest, and sue
the collectors to recover back the sum paid, and, in this view, chapter
13, of the Acts of 1873, did not impair the contract contained in the
12th section of the bank charter, and it was upon this ground the
validity of the act was recognised by the federal Supreme Court. The
Act of 1873, chapter 13, does profess to take away all jurisdiction
against officers of the state in the cases named. The act was, no doubt,
intended to protect the treasury and taxes of the state and its property,
even against claims that might be valid. It was principally intended,
no doubt, to protect the state from being compelled to litigate with the
taxpayers as to their right to pay their taxes in the new issue of the
Bank of Tennessee, and have the collection of taxes suspended by these
suits. The necessities of government require summary remedies for
the collection of revenue, and to secure this was the principal object of
the act, and it may be that in some cases this court has extended the
act to an unwarranted length in protecting state officers. I think it
could not have been intended to deprive the citizens of all remedies in
any case to protect themselves by injunction against the execution of
unconstitutional laws by officers of the state.
The object is not to reach the treasury funds or property of the state,
or to reach the state or interfere with its laws or the administration of
its public affairs. It is precisely the reverse. It is to protect the
treasury funds and property of the state, and to protect the state from
the consequences of unauthorized acts about to be performed in her
name. The only ground, I repeat, upon which it can be assumed that
itis the will of the state that the bonds be issued, is the unednstitutional void law.
There are cases where executive officers are vested with sole discretion
to determine the validity of the law under which they act, and where
their action cannot be controlled by the court or its validity questioned
afterwards. Such was the question of Jonesboro Turnpike Co. v.
Brown, 8 Baxter 490.
There are other cases where, although the court will not control
action, the same question may come before the court and be decided
differently, such was the case of Williams v. Register. 1 Cooke 213.
The executive department of the government cannot be delayed and
embarrassed in the execution of the laws necessary to the administration of its affairs, until the constitutionality of the laws be determined by the courts: Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wallace 475.
The question of the constitutionality of this law is one ultimately
for the courts. It cannot be held that the funding board were vested
with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the law. Their
decision could not, in the nature of things, be final. If they were to
determine the law unconstitutional and refuse to issue the bonds, the
court would, no doubt, have jurisdiction by mandamus, if it decided
the law valid, to compel them to act. On the other hand, the court
determining the law unconstitutional, have the jurisdiction to restrain
their action by injunction, as in such cases mandamus and injunction
are correlative remedies: Board of Liquidation v. -Me
Comb, 2 Otto 531.
So that in any event it is a question for the courts. It therefore
VOL.
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becomes a question whether it is to be decided now or after the bonds
are issued. If the court has jurisdiction and the proper parties before
it, there is every reason why the injury should be prevented rather
than attempt to remedy the wrong afterward : Mott v. Penna. Railroad
Co., 30 Penn. St. 9; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace 203; McComb v.
Board of Liquidation, 2 Otto 531.
It is said the state is an indispensable party. If the state can be
made a party ia such cases it should be done; that it cannot, is a sufficient reason for not doing so: Davis v. Gray, 16 Wallace 220. The
attorney-general for the state or any counsellor employed by the governor
would have been heard if they so desired.
The funding board are the only persons who could have been made
defendants. The creditors have as yet taken no benefit under the act,
and are besides unknown, and are too numerous to be made defendants:
Davis v. Gray, supra.
The complainants only have the interest of citizens and taxpayers in
common with all other citizens and taxpayers of the state. This would
clearly not give them the right to prevent the execution of any unconstitutional law that might incidentally affect them. But such in interest has been held sufficient to entitle them to prevent the establishment
of new counties: Bradley v. Com., 2 Humph. 428; the issuance of
illegal bonds by a county : Winston v. T. & P. Railroad Co., I Baxter 60; also to prevent 'the execution of an unconstitutional law by
which the states right of taxation was to be relinquished : Mott v. Penna.
Railroad Co., supra; also, to prevent the issue of unauthorized bonds:
Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 147.
To suspend the execution of this law will not interfere with or embarrass the general administration of the public affairs of the state, either
with respect to its internal government or in the consummation of any
public enterprise upon which tie prosperity of the state may be supposed to depend.
The creditors already hold the bonds of the state. To suspend the
execution of the act will only prevent the exchange of their bonds for
others, which, in my opinion, would contain stipulations by which the
state cannot be bound. and, if in this I am correct, it is to the interest
of the creditors to have it so now declared.
I am of opinion that the decree of the chancellor dismissing the bill
is erroneous.
. The first of the head-notes prefixed to
the foregoing report of this case is sustained by the opinions of Justices McFARLAND, TunxEY and FmEMAN, but
dissented from by Chief Justice DEADEnoi and Special Justice EwING. The
second is sustained by the opinions
of Justice McFAnLAPD, Chief Just:ce
DEADERIcK and Special Justice EWING,
but dissented from by Justice FREEMAN,
no opinion being expressed by Justice
TuRNEY. The third is sustained by the
opinions of the chief justice, and all the

justices, but dissented from by the
special justice.
It is a subject of regret that all the
opinions cannot appear in this place, but
their length renders it impossible. Mr.
Justice TuRNEY places his judgment
wholly upon the coupon feature of the
act pretermitting any expression of
opinion on the subject of bribery of the
legislature, while Mr. Justice FREEMAN,
in an able exposition of the principles
that arc involved in the consideration
of that question, reaches tile conclusion
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that, when an act of the legislature,
public or private, is in the nature of a
contract, and particularly where that
contract becomes irrepealable under the
federal constitution, and is procured by
the bribery of the members of the legislature, it is no invasion by the court of the
province of the legislature to enjoin its
execution, so that the people shall not
become burdened by a law imposed by
that character of fraud. He carefully
limits the application of the remedy to
contract enactments, and agrees that as
to all other legislation the remedy by
repeal is effectual. Air. Justice McFARLAND seems to find relief in that
case, not. in the power to enjoin the
execution of the act, but of the people
to repeal it, if it be repealable, but if
not, to repudiate the fraudulent contract;
and the three assenting justices may
be assumed to have left the remedy
there or to have declared there is none.
Where the party bound by the contract
is a sovereign state, this may be an
effectual remedy, but where it is a municipality, as a county or town, this
might be no remedy at all, unless the
sovereign state withdraws the powers
of taxation, as in Meriwether v. Garrett,
102 U. S. 472. In any ease, an innocent party in possession of the bond or
other evidence of debt, suffers where the
remedial injunction is not applied under
the rule of Mr. Justice FltREx.A.
On
this point relating to bribery of the legislature, that learned justice says :
"If the Constitution forbids this inquiry, if it can never be made by 'the
courts in any case-and if it does not
so forbid, it ought to be made in the
case of contracts proposed to be made,
if anywhere-there is no other remedy.
If executed in the form of the bonds
in this ease, it is idle to say the 'legislature can repeal the law. The contract will be held unaffected and enforced in spite of that. To say the
state shall repudiate the debt is not
remedy, but only the act of force or will

that cannot be coerced. That the member can be expelled from the legislature
is no remedy, it is only punishment
inflicted by the state. To say that his
constituency can refuse to elect him is
equally futile. They could do that in
any case. But that would not affect the
liability of the bonds in any way, that
would remain precisely the same in both
cases, and so the end sought would be
totally ineffectual and no remedy at
all."
Again, "I would hold that, in all
cases of private contracts obtained by
individuals for their own benefit or
advantage, where it could be clearly
shown the assent of the members, or
sufficient of them, to pass the bill was
procured by bribery, the contract as
between the state or her taxpayers and
the parties so bribing, is one that may be
avoided, and on a proper case the courts
should fearlessly apply the remedy. No
restraints of delicacy should make them
hesitate. I confine my opinion strictly
to the case before me, and to like cases,
and to acts of the legislature making or
proposing to make contracts, expressly
repudiating the application of the principle to legislation in the general sense,
or in any case except the one indicated.
Such an application of the principle is, I
think, perfectly safe, can do no injury,
and is not, as I think, any infringement
upon any affirmative or implied inhibition of the Constitution."
The three opinions which discuss this
question are instructive and exhaustive, but our readers must forego the
benefit of a full publication for want of
space.
Air. Justice TuDNEY pretermits the
question just mentioned as unnecessary
to the determination of the case, as a
majority are agreed that the act is void
because of the tax-coupon feature of
it. On this point lie agrees with
MCFARLAND

and FtREEMAN, JJ., and

discusses the question very much as
they do, but gives an additional ground
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for his judgment not noticed by them.
It violates that provision of the state
constitution which appropriates*the taxes
derived from polls to educational purposes, the exception of the statute in
favor of the common school thud not
being commensurate with she constitutional provision: Coast. 1870, art. 11,
sect. 12.
Mr. Special Justice fElxG, sitting
in place of 'Mr. Justice COOPER, who
was incompetent by reason of interest,
thinks the bill should have been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because
it was substantially a suit against the
state or its officers, and forbidden by
the Act of 1873, and because tie
court could only grant relief, if at
all, at the suit of the state, but not
of the taxpayers. He thinks the tax
receivable coupon feature objectionable,
perhaps, as a matter of policy, but
clearly within the power of the legislature; and that because it is a contract,
and from that circumstance the federal
courts might acquire the ultimate jurisdiction to pass upon its validity or the
right to repeal it, is no sound objection
to it. It must be presumed those courts
will decide properly. He says : "The
law may be unwise, but it is not for that
reason unconstitutional. If it be unconstitutional upon future contingencies,
there is no possibility of its becoming
oppressive, as relief could always' be
had by legislation, which must be sustained by the courts. It is upon the
possibility of its becoming oppressive
that the argument is mde against its
constitutionality. But it is neither unconstitutional in presenti nor in yuturo,
because of these possibilities. Its oppression under changed circumstances
may be relieved against. The fear that
this which is called an unconstitutional
act may be enforced by the federal courts
as a constitutional law, is not, I repeat,
a legitimate argument in favor of an injunction, because it supl)oses that the
federal courts will not do right. What

then, if our legislature had no federal
restriction, and the omnipotence of parliament, would the law be repealable
and therefore valid ? Does this legal
restriction then determine the character
of the law? The federal restriction reducing our sovereignty may disable us
from repealing acts, right or wrong, and
therefore may make it unwise for us to
pass laws of contract which we may not
repeal, but does it affect the power?
The legal restriction should be looked to
in the exercise of the power as in any
event it attaches."
This strikes the most vulnerable place,
perhaps, in the position of the majority
if it fairly states that position. But it
also suggests a potential reason for constitutional inhibition on the legislature
from passing "laws of contract which
we may not repeal," as that is by far
the safest guaranty against unwise laws
of contract. The Tennessee Constitution of 1870, did much in that direction
by substituting section 8, of art. 11, for
section 7 of the same article, in the Constitution of 1834, but it certainly falls
short of the entire restriction which
would be contained in a reservation of
power to alter, amend or repeal all laws,
by which every state constitution could
possibly limit the prohibition of the federal constitution, in its practical operation, to those laws which might impair
private contracts. But the principle of
the majority ruling in this case operates
to protect the slate against any contract
that bargains away or imposes restrictions upon the absolute powers of taxation and appropriation of the public
revenue, by declaring the contract itself
void, whether the act be repealable or
irrepealable. What is said about the
federal restriction is rather in favor of
the 'remedy by injunction, than applicable to the character of legislation as
being valid or invalid. The court secures to itself, by sustaining that remedy,
the right of ultimate decision in construing the state constitution, and ten-
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ders unnecessary any appeal to the federal Supreme Court to construe the
federal Constitution. This is, probably,
an unnecessary precaution, as the latter
court would quite surely follow this very
decision, whatever its own judgment
might be, if it should have occasion hereafter to hear the question, as it followed
tie Virginia court the other way. It
does not follow the vacillations of the
state courts in the construction of state
constitutions, but otherwise is quite obedient to them.
On the general subject Mr. Justice
E WIvG, says : "If it is unconstitutional
at all it is not upon speculative possibilities. If it were absolutely certain that
the state would always retain its present
ability to meet interest and provide for
ordinary governmental expenses, there
would be no ground for the charge that
it is infringed upon. Absolute sovereignty in a republic may consist with
moral obligation which is neither coercive
nor derogatory to sovereignty. * * *
When the ability is lost it may well be
that the moral obligation ceases or is suspended. The new circumstances may
justify a repeal, and this repeal we must
suppose would be sustained by the federal courts, as not impairing the obligation of contracts. In this view the
coupon feature becomes merely a convenient mode of providing for payment of
'tile
public debt." The learned judge
discusses all the questions elaborately
and with distinguishing ability; but want
of space forbids further extracts.
To the above argument the majority
opinions reply that the objectionable coercion is not found in the moral obligation,
but the power to compel payment regardless of that consideration and against the
will of the people as it may exist at the
moment at which any particular payment is demanded within the ninety-nine
years the bonds mature. And, they do
not think it safe to rely on any court to
hold that the fact of impairment of the
obligation protected by the federal con-

stitution depends, in any way, upon a
change of circumstances simply in respect
to ability to pay. See Sturges v. Crownzasldeld, 4 Wheat. 122. That might
devolve on the courts the legislative
function of determining when the ability
to pay is gone, and permit them to do
that which is prohibited to the legislature, namely, to impair or abrogate the
obligation according to changing circumstances disconnected with the contract
itself, their judgment being only a review of the action of the legislature on
the question of fact whether the debtor
was able to pay.
Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, in defining

the obligation alluded to by the Constitution says, in Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 258, "It cannot, for a moment,
he conceded that the mere moral law is
intended, since the obligation which that
imposes is altogether of the imperfect
kind, which the parties to it are free to
obey or not, as they please. It cannot
be supposed it was with this law the
grave authors of this instrument were
dealing."
The question of the suability of the
officers appointed to fund the debt, and
that of the right of a taxpayer to file the
bill, are instructively discussed, but
being of somewhat local interest the
points are not further noticed here.
The conclusions of the venerable chief
justice, being very brief, are subjoined
as follows:
" The main question arising in this
case has been so elaborately and exhaustively discussed in the four opinions
already read, that I deem it unnecessary
to repeat reasons already given or cite
authorities already referred to, to sustain the conclusions at which I have
arrived upon the several questions involved.
"I content myself, therefore, with
the simple announcement of the conclusions at which I have arrived upon the
several propositions contained ir the bill
and discussed at the bar.

